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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the financial policy instruments 
and institutional mechanisms involved in Australian defence 
policy and which are readily available to the government for it 
to meet its security objectives. In addition, the thesis 
addresses the nature of financial responses when Australian 
defence policy is disturbed by events of a military, strategic 
or national security nature. The political and strategic issues 
which give rise to these events are not discussed. 
Attention is concentrated on the role of key institutions; the 
appropriateness of current financial policies in relation to the 
scale, intensity and duration of military conflict; and the 
financial consequences (normally measured as costs - see Chapter 
3) of engaging in military activities. Borrowing from Lord 
Lionel Robbins and discussed further in Chapter 1, the thesis 
aims to " ... afford insights into the physiology of the body 
economic in conditions of unusual strain."l 
This paper avoids intentionally the wider field of defence 
economics2. That discipline has little relevance to aspects of 
operational financial policy, its adjustment and management in 
a defence emergency, and decision-making based on it and other 
critical, strategic factors. Other structural and economic 
forces which affect Australia nationally in the normal course 
of events (eg. tariffs, subsidies, dumping etc.) are also 
marginal to this thesis. They are addressed only in so far as 
they might affect these financial mechanisms and policies. 
1. Lord Robbins, The Econo.ic Proble. in Peace and far, Haclillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1950, p.2 
2. Host books on peacetile defence econolics include significant sections on latters such as procurelent, the 
lilitary-industrial cOlplex, planning and budgeting etc. In a defence contingency, there .ight be other 
econolic side-effects on the comlunity. These vould likely include such factors as increased defence-related 
production, labour costs and competition for skilled personnel, increased costs for state and local 
governlents especially those vithin possible areas of operations, and effects on trade. However, these topics 
themselves vould each occupy an entire paper and attelPts to treat the. in a thesis focussing on finance and 
financial policy vould do scant justice to thea or the topic at hand. 
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In Australia, the historic background to the funding of war-
related defence activities can be located in the experience of 
current institutions, such as the Treasury and the Commonwealth 
and Reserve Banks, in moulding policies and evolving methods for 
dealing with the older rubric of "war finance" (see Chapter 4). 
War finance is a general title that covers the manifold 
responsibilities assumed by various authorities in guiding and 
managing the resources of the nation during " ... a great change 
from peace-time experience"3 - that is, in facing "the economic 
consequences of war". It is a concept rooted in experience. Its 
definition is self-evident but its methods are as complex as the 
apparatus of the state which it serves. It owes as much to the 
observable methods of government practice in responding to 
either periodic economic stresses or a past crisis induced by a 
major war as it does to academic or theoretical constructs. 
Nonetheless, there is a small body of economic literature within 
which the evolution of institutional practices must be located. 
Chapter 1 examines the classic theoretical offerings available 
on the subject of war finance but illustrates that these 
theories are derived from observed experience by individuals of 
very practical affairs. 
War finance originated in the crises of funding past wars. It 
has been one of the outgrowths of the developing institutions of 
the modern state, and has complex ties with the institutions and 
policies of the international economic arena. In the late 20th 
Century, the practice and purpose of financing wars would 
generally accord with a "realist" (as opposed to "idealist") 
persuasion in international relations. The realist perspective 
has the following general characteristics: 
* It is state-centric. 
* It views financial mechanisms (eg. aid policy, freezes, 
blockades) as intrinsic tools of state policy . 
...... _ ..... -.. _ ....... _.-......... _-............. _ ..... _._ .................... __ .......... _ .... . 
3. J.M.Keynes, How to Pay fOl the rar, Haclillan and Co.Ltd., 1940, p.4. 
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* It assumes that the international order, in both its 
political and economic dimensions, is ultimately anarchi c, 
turbulent and uncertain - war constitutes an 
intensification of these features. 
* It views the role of finance/economics in neo-
mercantilist terms4. In this role, war finance underlines 
the military and other security instruments of the state. 
It may also be the driving engine of government action in 
pursuing its other policies. 
* Despite the ultimate turbulence of the world order, there 
are sufficient international economic institutions and 
mechanisms in place (eg. the IMF, World Bank, the private 
international banking system as a whole) that will fund, 
underpin, or pervade the waging of war in a fairly 
predictable manner. 
As modern realism takes on its late 20th century economic 
guiseS, war finance assumes an implicit relationship between 
security and wealth.6 The realist view of the global political 
environment maintains that self-interest remains the enduring 
motif of the modern state and that national security (be it 
economic or military) is the means for achieving that goal. 
Whether security continues to be defined militarily, or whether 
recent neo-mercantilist tendencies succeed in asserting the 
primacy of economic policy as an instrument of national 
struggle, it remains a fact that finance must underwrite any 
deliberate government security policy. War finance grows out of 
this fact. 
4. Mercantilism refers to trading practices prevalent in Europe in the 16-18th centuries. In brief, imports 
were bad (outfloY of gold) and exports were good (inflow of gold); tariffs and bounties were policy 
instrulents for achieving these ends. It was opposed in principle by Ada. Smith, except with regard to 
national security. Neo-mercantilisl gained headway after the Great Depression, when governlents designed 
policies to protect dOlestic industries from full overseas cOlpetition and/or to encourage exports at the 
expense of other overseas exporters or the dOlestic industries of the ilportinq nation. Neo-Iercantilisl 
regards a trade surplus, or a positive current account, as intrinsic to national security, and the balance of 
trade figures (which fori the bulk of the current account) as the key leasurelent of this belief. 
5. Richard A.Higgott, The forld Bconomic Order and Australia: Towards a Wider Definition of Security, frol 
the conference on Australia and the lorld, Prologue and Prospects, Australian National University, Canberra, 
6-9 December 1988. 
6. As if to reinforce the truth, and urgency, of this belief, file Magazine has elphasised the economic basis 
of the Bush Adlinistration's quest for security. Alice Rivlin, forler head of the Congressional Budget 
Office, was quoted in the fall Street Journal (cited in file, 30 January 1989) as saying,· 'he budget 
deficit ... has becole a defense issue, a foreign policy issue ... • and Jales Baker, the Secretary of State, is 
quoted later as recognizing (Tile, 13 February 1989) •... the prilacy of econolic policy in the late 20th 
century." 
1 !~, 
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Financial requirements are the common denominator across the 
several generic levels of defence contingencies which have 
received endorsement as planning tools for guiding defence 
activity. Low level contingency, as an accretion to current 
peacetime preparedness, occupies the opposite end of the 
spectrum from declared and total war. The latter, however, is 
the source of most of the experience and all of the theory of 
war finance, when its role has been to serve to mobilize the 
entire resources of the nation - as eventually under"taken in 
World War II. 
Several defence economic generalisations need to be made to 
establish a framework for an understanding of the operation and 
limitations of war finance: 
* Defence spending (of which, war finance is but a single 
component - and even then in unusual circumstances only) is 
a political issue as much an economic one, in the sense 
that the " ... mediation of differing perceptions of need is 
worked out in a political process".7 
* The level of defence expenditure is a function of a 
country's perception of the nature and extent of threats 
against it. 
* The transition from peacetime expenditure to some level 
of defence contingency or war expenditure is independent of 
the baseline pattern of spending to date. What matters is 
the celerity of the transition and the co-ordination of the 
appropriate military strategy and financial policies. 
The successful implementation of financial policy in 
underpinning a national response to a conflict will depend on 
several key variables, possibly independent of the actual level 
or trend of that conflict, and set out at length in Chapter 5: 
(a) The ability of Australia to control (or be perceived to 
control) the conflict, even in the event of escalation; 
(b) The reaction of the Australian Government to financing 
the conflict, be it by loans, deficit financing, taxation 
or internal reallocation of resources among the broad 
........................ _ .... _ .......... _ ..... _ ..... _ .............. _ ............ -... __ .-... _ ........... . 
7. Gavin Kennedy, Defense Econolics, London, Duckworth and Co.Ltd., 1983, p2. 
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functions of government;8 
(c) The reporting of the conflict by the media; and 
(d) The expectations of financial markets (Keynes' "animal 
spirits") concerning the resolution of the conflict and the 
type of post-crisis environment in which Australia must 
continue to function. 
Two important qualifications need to be placed on the role of 
finance in the discussion of defence emergencies. Firstly, a 
conflict which remains at a strategically defined low level does 
not guarantee that the reactions of markets, financial 
institutions and overseas investors will also be "low level". 
The MX missile crisis of early 1985 (a case study discussed in 
Chapter 2), an internal political affair, led to a crisis of 
confidence in Australia's "political" economy and a collapse in 
the value of the Australian dollar out of all apparent rational 
proportion to the affair itself. Secondly, a conflict which 
escalates or leads into more substantial conflict, or oscillates 
over an extended period of time, should not imply that financial 
requirements or responses will do the same. The financial 
community will adopt its own responses to the contingency, which 
mayor may not accord with the response of the government.9 The 
implications of this are discussed in Chapter 5. 
In summary, finance (or war finance in its defence emergency 
role) is an instrument of state policy. It underpins and shapes 
the gamut of defence activity both in peacetime and during a 
strategic crisis of some dimension when the survival of the 
nation is not an issue. 
_ ...... _-......... _ ......... _-_ ..................... _-................ _ ... _ ............... _. 
8. These 10 functions being defence(9.6\), health(10.0\), education(7.0\), social velfare(27.4\), housing & 
cOlaunity amenities(2.2\), culture & recreation(1.3\), general public services(7.1\), general economic 
services(S.S\), not allocated to function, vhich includes paYlent to the states(19.3\) and public debt 
interest(10.6\). The figures in brackets refer to achieved financial expenditure for 1986-87, as reported in 
Budget papers for the 1987-88 estimates. 
9. A lov level contingency, however defined or measured, could even adopt a fora of normality where the 
element of crisis dissipates and increased military activity becoles part of the standard economic assesslent 
of that country's well-being, part of its 'risk-assesslent ' • 
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CHAPTER 1: THE THEORY AND 
EXPERIENCE OF WAR FINANCE 
1. Introduction 
The origin of a conceptual framework specifically addressing the 
financing of war lies with David Ricardol (although he built 
upon the insights of Adam Smith a generation before). Ricardo 
was responding to the series of economic crises brought on by 
the Napoleonic Wars. Apart from sundry observations made during 
the next century or so, the next original work produced on 
methods of war finance came from J.M. Keynes. His response, like 
Ricardo's, arose as a reaction to war, to the injustices of the 
British domestic economic experience in the First World War. 
Keynes also sought to aid in preparation for planning 
expenditures (and this time around, equalizing the financial 
sacrifices) for the coming Second World War. 
The writings of Lord Robbins, consequent to the Second World 
War, were, it will be argued, largely critical of Keynes' 
argument for the primacy of finance and were summary reflections 
of his own financial experience in the war. They were not 
seminal. They ratified the experience of total war, but were 
less relevant to the new age of limited wars (made almost 
essential by the alternative of nuclear annihilation) which did 
not challenge the primacy of economic policy in government 
considerations. 
Therefore, Keynes is the authority for guiding financial policy 
in scenarios which do not rise above the low level, or which 
remain regional in their immediate strategic repercussions. 
2. War Finance: Theory and Practice 
The twentieth century Italian philosopher of history, Benedetto 
· ...... -· .. · ... _. ___ u._ ....... _ ... _ .. ____ ............. __ ._ ... _ ..... ___ ......... . 
1. C.S. Shoup (pp. 143-4) laintained that Ricardo vas the first political econolist to specifically address 
the problels of financing var. The tvo key sources vere, a. the "Essay on the Funding System", 1819, and b. 
paragraphs 3-7 of Chapter IVII of Ricardo's lost famous york, On the Principles of Political EconolY, and 
1axation, 1817; see Shoup, C.S., Ricardo on 1axation, Colulbia University Press, Nev York, 1960, pp. 143-4, 
and especially Chapter II, "ar Finance', pp.143-167. 
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Croce once remarked that " ... all action is thought; and all 
thought is action". Allowing for a certain degree of literary 
aphorism, his statement encapsulated the notion that, in 
reality, there cannot be (and is not) a clear disjuncture 
between theory (thought) and practice (action). Implicit is the 
recognition that thought does not cease when activity commences; 
they co-exist. 
In other words, theoretical assumptions underpin and pervade all 
activity. Theory constitutes a conceptual framework through 
which events are perceived and must themselves travel. In this 
sense, practical knowledge, policy and decision making are not 
possible in the absence of a theoretical framework. The way the 
world is perceived, and the way activity is pursued, are the 
results of theoretical assumptions and observed experience. 
But this is not a thesis about theory, per see Instead, the 
thesis draws on existing theoretical and historical insights in 
order to establish a framework within which financial policy 
making takes place. From these insights, it detects a set of 
basic principles on which subsequent policy developments (and 
specific case studies) might build. 
In this thesis, then, theorising is understood as the literary 
record of solutions or explanations to historical dilemmas of 
raising war finance, and the attempt to draw from particular 
historical experience or observation some general principles. 
These insights are in turn modified by subsequent practice. In 
this sense, the relationship between theory and practice is an 
intimate and inseparable one. 
This relationship between theory and practice is rendered more 
acute in the case of financial policy by the fact that the 
theories of raising war finance are the creations of individuals 
with extensive public experience (Ricardo was a banker, Keynes a 
Treasury official and author, Robbins an academic co-opted by 
the government for the duration of the Second World War, and 
Smith a teacher whose survival depended upon the quality of his 
lectures and writing), reflecting on the institutions and events 
8 
they witnessed around them. 
The theories of war finance are few, and emerged from particular 
historical circumstances. Thus, while they provide a framework 
and range of insights for policy makers, they are to some extent 
restricted by the specific nature of the events which gave rise 
to them. It is for this reason that the experience of both 
policy making and institutional responses in recent conflicts 
must be examined alongside any exposition of the theory of war 
finance. Such conflicts diverge from the events which generated 
earlier theories and may require policy responses which are 
modifications of those suggested by existing theory. In 
addition, an examination of the policy direction and financial 
consequences associated with these conflicts provides a 
background which may be used to generate new theoretical 
insights. The conflicts which are examined later in this thesis, 
as well as the discussions of contingency planning, are 
different in degree, in some cases substantially, from those 
which generated the theories discussed in this chapter. They are 
subjects of interest in particular for the ways in which the 
state and its institutions have both adopted and adapted (or 
failed to do so) existing theories in the light of changed 
circumstances. 
The two broad options of taxation and borrowing were recognised 
by Adam Smith (and acknowledged in later events and by later 
authors) and endorsed by governments in the conduct of wars and 
conflicts. The accretion of variations on these two basic 
options (eg. in the nature and scale of the borrowings, or in 
the type of taxation imposed) are as much a reflection of the 
increasing complexity of the modern state as they might be the 
original theories of later commentators. Theory has endorsed 
experience but has rarely attempted to transcend it. 
The theories of war finance discussed in this thesis are the 
most prominent, coherent and accessible of existing opinions. 
They are few because the discipline does not lend itself to 
uniqueness, originality or disputatious heresy. Yet being 
empirical in method and belief, the theorists themselves would 
9 
be the first to admit, that as the state continues to evolve, an 
accretion to their theories may need to be developed to reflect 
the latest changes in technology at the disposal of the state, 
or the structures, policies and processes which drive it. None 
of the theories have applied universality, and it cannot be 
pretended that they would supply ready solutions to unique 
problems or crises which periodically beset the state. 
3. Adam Smith 
In the fifth book of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith addressed the 
implications of defence expenditure by the state and the 
necessity of raising sufficient revenue (as well as the results 
of not doing so) to finance the conduct of wars undertaken by 
the United Kingdom in his lifetime. 
In Smith's opening words security was, "The first duty of the 
sovereign"2, which involved "protecting the society from the 
violence and invasion of other independent societies, [and] can 
be performed only by means of a military force". The two 
functions of the state in Smith's day were defence and justice. 
Unlike justice, defence did not return revenue. Therefore he 
classified it as a necessary but unproductive activity. Being 
unproductive it did not accumulate capital and did not generate 
an increase in the capital stock; it produced neither savings 
nor profit. Being necessary, and therefore a refutation to some 
extent of the laissez-faire economic principles set out in Book s 
1 and 2, and upon which his reputation rests, defence should 
then at least be conducted efficiently. The most useful 
instrument for executing the defence of the realm was a small 
professional army (not conscripts), which was itself a 
reflection of the division of labour increasingly evident in 
eighteenth century industrial society . 
.. ~ ... -....... -................ -.............................................. _ ..... _ ...... -.................... . 
2. Ada. Smith, An Inquiry into the Natule and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, 
Chicago, 1952, p.405i published in the 'Great Books of the 'estern World', Vol 39. Smith rejected the 
mercantilist doctrine of national policy which sought to control the use of resources in such a way that 
ensured a continuing favourable balance of paYlents and created a self-supporting politico-economic unit. 
Nevertheless, in extrele circuistances of threat to national well-being, Slith was prepared to allow 
governlent intervention to protect the 'invisible hand' of Books 1 and 2 of his Magnum Opus. 
r 
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In examining the financing of the military establishment, Smith 
was concerned with two broad tendencies: 
(a) The increasing cost of defence and the conduct of war 
to the public finances3; and 
(b) The explosion of the national debt since 1694. The 
national debt was first created with the inception of the 
Bank of England, its immediate and intentional purpose 
being to finance the United Kingdom's wars with the France 
of Louis XIV. 
There were two conceivable methods of financing wars in the 
eighteenth century: 
(1) By direct taxation; naturally this was unpopular and 
" ... the more loudly the people complain of every new tax, 
the more difficult it becomes ... either to find out new 
subjects of taxation, or to raise much higher the taxes 
already imposed upon the 01d"4. 
Consequently recourse was had to: 
(2) Borrowing, ft ••• a mortgage on the public's revenue"5. 
Smith identified two types of borrowing: 
(a) Personal credit - a type of promissory note, short 
term, non-interest bearing, and tied to the object for 
which it was raised; and 
(b) Borrowing upon assignments: 
(i) short term - where the principal and the interest 
were expected to be repaid; and 
(ii) perpetuity - where only the interest was repaid in 
the short-term (ie. in the lender's lifetime). The 
principal might be refunded over 100 years or so and 
might be seen by the lender as a life-time investment in 
the well-being, and victory, of the state. 
Smith was alarmed by the apparently unchecked growth of the 
national debt for his country's global imperial wars which of 
themBelveB enBured no adequate compenBatlon or rate of return 
.... _ ...... _ ............... _-............ _ ..... __ ........................... _--_ ............. _ .. _.-... .. . 
3. 'The great change Introduced into the art of war by the invention of firearl5, had enhanced still further 
both the expenses of exercising and disciplining any particular number of soldiers 1n tile of peace, and that 
of employing them in tile of var. Both their arms and aDlunition have become more expensive. A musket is a 
lore expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrov; a cannon or a lor tar than a balista or a 
catapulta ..• •• Cited in Gavin Kennedy, Defense Econolics, London, Duckvorth, 1983, p.S. 
4. Slith, OPt cit., p.408 
5. Ibid., p.404. 
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for their cost, even when successful (for example, he viewed 
colonisation as an economic "sink")6. Nonetheless, borrowing was 
inevitable given that the cost of wars far outweighed the annual 
and even accumulated revenue of the state and that wars, once 
commenced, were of unknown duration. In Smith's words, 
.•. when war cOles they [governlents] are both unvilling and unable to increase their revenue in 
proportion to the increase of their expense. They were unwilling for fear of offending the people, 
who, by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be disgusted with the war; and they 
are unable frol not well knowing Yhat taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted7. 
Smith opposed borrowing to finance wars on the grounds of 
economic efficiency. It would prove much cheaper in the long run 
to finance wars on a "cash" or "fight as you earn" basis than it 
would be to borrow. Also the national debt was a century old and 
growing, and a new war would merely serve to add another layer 
of debt over existing ones, with a long-term detrimental impact 
on the productivity of the wealth-generating portion of the 
social system. However, he admitted that in time of war the 
principal aim of government was to " ... relieve the present 
exigency .... The future liberation of the public's revenue they 
leave to the care of poster i ty"S. 
4. David Ricardo 
From the time of Smith's writing The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
until his death in 1790 the national debt of England doubled to 
some 240 million pounds, due principally to the requirements of 
fighting the American War of Independence. As a result of the 
drawn-out Napoleonic Wars the national debt grew to 800 million 
pounds by 1815. In his Essay on the Funding System9 David 
Ricardo, a London banker, expressed concern with the ways and 
means of funding this huge debt. Whereas Smith had approached 
the economics of defence more from an historical and moral 
6 It was also lorally bankrupt. To lake war (ie. victory) 'pay', leant the econolic exploitation of 
territories captured during and retained after the var. This would eventually have a corrupting influence on 
his country. It is worth noting here that in his own lifetile Smith was renowned as a loral philosopher, and 
only posterity has lauded hil as the founder of the discipline of political econolics (Weconolics' was 
christened a hundred years later in Gerlany.) 
7. Ibid., p.408. 
S. Ibid., p.406. 
9. This vas written by Ricardo in 1819 for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
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context (particularly his survey of the past in Book 3), Ricardo 
emphasised the effects of war on the current social system, the 
disruption to the free flow of capital, effects on trade, the 
impact on productivity of the temporary demands of war and the 
like. But Ricardo and Smith were alike in two vital respects: 
(a) in a choice between "opulence" and defence, both saw 
themselves as obliged to give defence the preference 
(Smith, for example, had supported the Navigation Acts 
which prohibited the use of foreign vessels for British and 
Colonial trade); and 
(b) both recommended that governments should conduct their 
wars by current taxation, not by loans. 
The necessity for increased taxation would be a restraining 
factor on the conduct of governments and the acquiescence of the 
population. Taxation would affect the present and loans the 
future. Of more immediate practical concern , the request for 
increased taxation to finance a war would require the support of 
Parliament and public opinion with regard to the rationale for 
that war. Ricardo wrote in 1820, 
When the pressure of the var is felt at once, vithout litigation, we shall be less disposed wantonly 
to engage in an expensive contest, and if engaged in it, we shall be sooner disposed to get out of it 
unless it vas [sicl a contest of sOle great national interestlO. 
Ricardo regarded the government's tendency to raise finance 
through the creation of public debt (ultimately to be paid for 
by society in the future, and ironically, by increased taxation) 
as an unnecessary evil. 
Ricardo believed in the operation of opportunity cost; that 
increased defence spending, sourced in higher taxes, would cause 
current consumption - personal and public - to fall. The 
financing of the war would be felt immediately in the 
population's decreased purchasing power and lower standard of 
living. Logically, then, the decision to enter upon the war 
would be subject to much more intense scrutiny. 
However there were, and still are, other problems with Smith's 
and Ricardo's advice to governments that all wars should be 
.... _ ....... _ ....... _--... _ ....... _._ ... -. .......... _-_ ........................................... ... 
10. Cited in G.Kennedy, op.cH .. , p.ll 
1; 
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funded from current consumption:!1 
(a) The ultimate decision to go to war, or at least 
commence military operations of some sort against another 
nation or enemy, is not based on economic issues of 
available finance, ready loans etc. (however economic the 
causes of the war might appear to present politicians or 
future scholars). The decision to do so, or the debates 
(public or private) on the wisdom of that decision, is 
based on political, strategic or even psychological factors 
which are often almost totally divorced from economic 
considerations. A nation which is ostensibly close to 
bankruptcy can afford a war if it is perceived as 
necessary. Smith had already observed that "there is plenty 
of ruin in a nation", implying that the level of aggregate 
sacrifice inherent in a country's ability to absorb the 
costs of war are almost limitless if the national interest 
urgently requires it (or if the prevailing power elites 
believe it is required); 
(b) the national debt already existed, had been used to 
fund previously successful wars and the country appeared to 
be stronger and more secure for it; and 
(c) even were a war debate to focus on the pros and cons of 
taxation or loans as the means of generating war finance, 
there remains a fundamental difference in choosing between 
the two. Firstly, the loan may approximate the national 
interest better (in that a loan will be paid for in 
aggregate eventually by the taxes of a future and 
victorious society) than present taxation which could be 
viewed more from personal interest. Secondly, a loan is 
nearer to the concept of defence/security as a public good. 
It is, in theory, a levy on society as a whole and avoids 
the divisiveness of taxation - at least in the short term -
where those interests opposed to the war are expected to 
also pay for it regardless of democratic principles.12 
The simple and clear-cut choice between taxation and the 
creation of public debt (or further public debt to be more 
accurate) to finance wars were the two options available to 18th 
and 19th century governments. The size of modern central 
government, particularly as its expenditure constitutes such a 
large percentage of Gross Domestic Product (in Australia in 
1986-7 about 27%), the densely packed and interdependent policy 
environment in which the government operates and the increased 
number of financial policy options available to it have created 
a new and complex web of possible consequences for public 
11. Although it should be noted that Ricardo held this belief lore strongly than Stith. 
12. Sensitivity towards this dilella of de.ocratic principles, often ignored in practice, was ilportant in 
deciding to fund the !Ierican involvelent in Vietnaa largely by leans of borroving. 
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decision-making in times of conventional strategic crisis. 
Nevertheless the various options and financial policies still 
fall under these two broad headings: taxation and borrowing. 
5. The 19th century 
The writings of Smith and Ricardo on war finance and the public 
debt were not isolated "voices in the wilderness". Thomas 
Jefferson regarded it as morally wrong that one generation 
should be required to payoff the war debts of a previous one 
and believed that any public debt should be discharged within 
twenty years of its inception. He thought a balanced budget so 
important that he proposed enshrining the concept in the US 
Constitution, a move recently revived.13 In the same period, 
Jean-Baptiste Say (A Treatise on Political Economy, 1803) 
objected to borrowing by governments unless it were justified to 
the extent that it produced economic returns of equivalent value 
for example, the government might borrow to build a bridge to 
facilitate transport and market access etc.; the cost of 
borrowing would thence be redeemed by the bridge's social value, 
its public utility. 
But war is a public utility of another kind. In the nineteenth 
century, in straight cost-benefit terms war became increasingly 
unproductlve~ Smith had already noted that the "soldier ... has 
no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be 
maintained by the public". Worse, not only was the peace-time 
military increasingly expensive ("The powder which is spent in a 
modern review is lost irrecoverably and occasions great 
expense") but wars were increasingly expensive to pursue ("The 
cannon and mortar are not only much dearer, but much heavier 
machines than the balista or catapulta; and require greater 
expense, not only to prepare them for the field but to carry 
them to it.") Additionally, the conduct of war - in Europe -
13. Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 26 November 1798, in forks, edt Paul Leicester Ford, Vol. VIII (Nev 
York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press, 1904l,p ~81., cited in Carolyn Webber and Aaron lildavsky, A 
History of Taxation and Expenditure in the 'estern forld, Nev York, Silon and Schuster, 1986, p.372. "I wish 
it were possible to obtain a single alendlent to our constitution. I would be willing to depend on that alone 
for the reduction of the administration of our governlent to the genuine principles of it's [sic] 
constitution; I lean an additional article, taking frol the federal government the power of borrowing.' 
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ruled out the notion of conquest , which in the past had had the 
benefit of making war a self-supporting economic activityH. War 
pursued as a matter of public policy by reasonably settled 
national states meant that the costs would be very high and the 
benefits suspect or intangible, as the resulting victory or 
defeat provided but marginal differences only to the financial 
balance sheet borne by the state involved (especially if it were 
a limited or ideological war, such as the American Civil War). 
Therefore, in the first half of the nineteenth century the idea 
was prevalent that, while war might bring victory, it was 
certain to increase the public debt. 
But, with the increasing sophistication of the nation-state and 
the complementary development of its central bureaucracy and 
attendant political economic theory, the attitude towards debt 
gradually changed. By the middle of the century debt came to be 
viewed increasingly as: 
* Something a people owes to itself (the government 
borrowing from the people, in whose interests the war would 
be fought); and 
* Relative to a country's ability to pay (increased debt 
might be outweighed by a proportionally greater increase in 
the country's productivity, later to be called GNP). 
Debt ceased to be an unnecessary evil, or immoral, and adopted 
many of the features of objective economic argumentl5. Lincoln, 
for example, thought that the people would not be oppressed by a 
debt owed to itself. His successors asserted (like modern 
14. ie. if successful; see Webber and Yildavsiy, op.cit. i the authors come to the sober conclusion that 
direct internal taxation and forced labour (resources) ensured a greater and lore reliable rate of return 
than var, or conquest, vith its attendant costs and risks. Econolic gain has seldol been a prile incentive 
for war. Frol the outset of the modern era, the obvious gains frol var have decreased vhile the costs have 
risen dralatically; see pp.238-9 of Webber and iildavsky: annual expenditure on vars: 1. England, 4,000 
pounds in 1600 to 4 lillion pounds to 9 million pounds in 1700; 2. France, 4.5 million livres in 1607 to 100 
lillion livres in 1706. Nevertheless the classic exception to the rule is the one folloving the Roman 
conquest of Macedonia in 167 B.C.; ROlan citizenry vas exempted frol personal taxation for half a lilieniul 
aftervards. 
15. For example, if borroving is used to generate national income, then the net addition to wealth (after 
repaYlent of the debt), leasured often by real grovth in GOP, varrants the initial borroving; or, if the 
substance of debt is never repaid but the interest paYlents constitute a decreasing portion of GDP, again 
borroving is varranted; or, if debt continues to increase but at a rate lover than real grovth of GOP, again 
borroving is validated by appeal to positive econolics. All these exalples represent borroving as investment 
into productive enterprises; the problem arises when borroving is targeted for public yorks, var purposes 
and/or rolling over outstanding debt. 
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supply-siders in the 1980s) that capacity to repay public debt 
increased with the nation's growing wealth. 
Macaulay, at the end of his History of England16, composed an 
eulogy of the institutions which had made England great and 
which amounted to a celebration of his belief in the positive 
role of economics in approaching the problem of debt. The 
national debt, created with the Bank of England, had fuelled the 
financial instruments of policy which allowed England repeatedly 
to crush the mercantilist policies17 of France: 
'hy leet the extraordinary charge of a year of war by seizing the [goods] of hard-working 
falilies •.. when Change Alley [the 17th century equivalent of the private banks] was swarling with 
people who did not know what to do with their loney and who were pressing everybody to borrow it?18. 
Macaulay added that future credit to a nation depended on that 
nation's previous power and inclination to pay past debts: 
The power of a society to pay its debts is proportional to the progress which that society has made 
in industry, in cOlmerce and in all the arts and sciences which flourish under the benignant 
influence of freedom and of equal law. The inclination of a society to pay debts is proportional to 
the degree in which that society respects the obligations of plighted faith19. 
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the budgetary 
process and philosophy took on a recognizably modern shape. The 
age was dominated by the search for (and in budgetary terms, 
achievement of) social order. The budget acquired a predictive 
16. Iritten during the 18505. 
17. Mercantilisl was personified by Colbert, the finance linister of Louis XIV. As an instrulent of policy in 
this case lercantilisl degenerated into a leans of extracting huge revenues for pursuing the ultimately 
unsuccessful vars of aggrandisement initiated by Louis (ie. no rate of return). The features of mercantilism 
included defence industrial autarky (recognized by Slith), rigidly centralised financial policy for revenue 
and expenditure and favourable balances of trade and payments. It becale, under Colbert, what Robbins later 
called "apoplexy at the centre and apathy at the extrelities', The Econolic Problel in Peace and Jar, p.24. 
From the naval point of view, Mahan scorned policies vhich were a lere overlay and did not stem from the 
natural occupations and habits of the people (The Influence of Seapover Upon History, 1660-1783) - ego 
saillaking was linked to the lerchant larine in England but had to be artificially fostered in France. 
18. Lord Macaulay, The History of England, edited and abridged by Hugh Trevor-Roper, Hamlondsworth, Penguin 
English Library, 1979, p.492. 
19. Ibid., p.498. Macaulay correctly highlights four vital aspects of national debt stemling from war: 
(1) the highly psychological aspects of raising loans and incurring debt based on past experience of respect 
for the "rules" , 
(2) the generation of national debt is not a problem if its growth is outpaced by increases in overall 
productivity or wealth; 
(3) debt is incurred to alleviate or add to general expenditure; it is not raised for the specific purpose of 
conducting war; 
(4) the creation of debt is the readjustlent of wealth in the cOllunitYi the lenders still gain. 
I: 
capacity. After Rica rdo , the next seminal thinker to produce 
original work on war finance was not until J.M.Keynes. What 
coloured the latter's thinking was not an entirely original 
methodology of financing wars but instead an adaptation of 
economic thinking to the evolving machinery of state finance 
since its transformation around 1900. These changes, in the 
broad, included: 
* The multiplication of governmental functions and the 
greater centralization of its role in determining the 
financial well -being of the state as a whole; 
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* The assumption of a central role by the budget process in 
the life of the government; 
* The rise of income tax as the key source of revenue for 
the government; 
* The achievement of " •.. annualarity, balance and 
comprehens i veness" 20 in Wes tern budgets; and 
* The recognition that borrowing was the key means to pay 
for war. 
The professionalization, centralization and public 
administration of taxing and spending were symptomatic of the 
new industrialized age of mass society. It coincided with the 
second industrial revolution, mechanical invention, ways of 
organizing work, the growth of the proletariat (including its 
spending power) and the search for order and efficiency 
(Progressivism).21 Welfare funding was also organised as a state 
function at this time but, except in Bismark's Germany, it 
remained small and did not yet compete with, let alone surpass, 
the monies allocated to defence. 
6. John Maynard Keynes 
Unlike the wars of the eighteenth century , the world wars of the 
twentieth century did not produce seminal economic works, nor 
.. •··· ••• _· ............... _ ....... _.04 ............................................. _ .............................. _. 
20. Webber and iildavsky, op.cit., p.428 
21. " ... by the middle of the nineteenth century, commentators had begun to write of the mighty fiscal 
engines of governlent. As they developed into structures we can recognize and understand, financial 
administrations becale powerful instrulents for extracting revenue frol the public, and then spending it for 
collective purposes that had no precedent in 'estern history. The wars of mass mobilization and the welfare 
state would not have been possible in the twentieth century without a vast increase in the ability to 
lobilize and allocate resources in the nineteenth century.', Ibid., p.300. 
r 
I 
I 
f, 
f 
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did they set in place extensive institutional mechanisms from 
which finance could develop further its traditional role as the 
"sinews of war". The world wars accelerated prior trends in 
fiscal management and endorsed the arrangements set in place 
before 1914. But while the wars emphasised financial continuity 
and not radical change, the level of spending ballooned 
exponentially. 
During World War 1 the UK financed about one third of its war 
effort via taxation, the rest by borrowing (unlike France which 
financed only about one sixth of its war effort by taxation). 
The UK was able to do this because of the income tax system 
which had been in place for over half a century22. Nevertheless, 
Keynes was critical of the war effort as financed, for two 
reasons: 
(a) During the war, the impact of inflation on wages was 
used as a de facto policy instrument by the British 
Treasury to raise the necessary yield of taxes (an early 
form of fiscal drag) to assist in paying for the war. As a 
result of an intensive industrial war effort and resulting 
demand for labour, average purchasing power increased but, 
because of rationing, was able to buy only the few consumer 
goods available. Prices rose and profits ended up in the 
hands of the entrepreneurial class, the suppliers of either 
war goods or consumer articles. After 1918 the accretion to 
the national debt was thus "owned" by the capitalist 
class.23 
(b) After the war, as aggregate demand (so much based on 
the government's demand for war-related supplies) fell, a 
massive post-war slump ensued. 
The Economic Consequences ot the Peace (1924) which criticized 
these events led to The General Theory ot Employment, Interest 
and Money (1936) which in turn dealt with the economic causes 
and consequences of the Depression. Keynes was concerned with 
two broad areas of government economic policy: 
-----------~----...... -.---.. -.--... ----
22. Ibid., pp.438-440. 
23. For example, rhe Official History of Australia in the First 'orld far records an increase in the loney 
supply frol 9.6m. pounds in 1914 to 571. pounds in 1920. During this same period the price index loved frol a 
base of 100 in 1913 to 247 in 1920, which represents an inflation rate of sOle 14\ pa, The price index for 
explosives rose about 24\ between 1914 and 1918, or about 5.5\ pa, However, in Wi II, the general inflation 
rate vas only sOle 5-6\ pa., due largely to wage and price controls, and general government interference in 
the econoly. This policy stelled to a large extent frol the perceived failures of government activity in the 
First forld lar. 
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* maintenance of aggregate demand, particularly to counter 
slumps; and 
* the role of government in acting as a stabilizer, not 
only by its own size but through conscious financial policy 
with which to interfere in the market as a fine-tuning 
instrument. 
Keynes disparaged " ... the abstract notions of Ricardo"24. It was 
unrealistic to expect society to pay for a modern war by 
taxation alone. Keynes' own theory proposed deliberately 
unbalanced budgets (ie. budget deficits) in peacetime to revive 
economies and relieve human misery from the extremes of laissez-
faire economics. Wartime would exacerbate the amount but not 
alter the purpose or nature of these deficits.25 
Yet there is a certain irony that Keynes, in arguing for budget 
deficits and borrowing, and attacking economists of the past 
like Ricardo for their purist stands on economic issues, 
instituted the first imaginative steps for dealing with the 
subject of war finance. He addressed the issue of taxation in 
isolation from the other well-used method of war finance -
borrowing.26 
In November 1939 " ... when the necessities of a war economy [must 
be] realised ... ".27, Keynes wrote a series of articles for The 
Times on the issue of war taxation (or "financial technique" 
combined with social justice); these were consolidated into book 
form in 1940. For the success of his radical proposals, Keynes 
was modest; they were " .. not rejected either by experts or by 
the public [and] no-one has suggested anything better". He 
labelled his draft proposals "compulsory savings": 
* Income tax was to be levied progressively on income and 
sales; this "war tax" was to be returned to the people 
after the war, in instalments to avoid both inflation and d 
postwar slump; 
.~ ............ --.................. -.................................... _ ............................ _._. 
24. John Maynard Keynes, The General rheory of ElploYlent, Interest and Honey, London, Paper lac 12, Macmillan 
and Co.Ltd., 1964, p.340 
25. Ricardo and Smith were both prepared to tolerate public deficits, but only in wartime. 
26. Lord Robbins stated that in his palphlet of 1940, Keynes' "explicit object vas to minilize recourse to 
the totalitarian controls which the financial exigencies of the war bade fair to lake necessary.", L.Robbins, 
Honey, Trade and International Relations, London, Maclillan, 1971, p.77. The paaphlet's prescriptions also 
served to control inflation. 
27.John Maynard Keynes, Hov to Pay for the Jar, London, Maclillan and Co. Ltd., 1940, p.iii 
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* The price mechanism was to remain central to British 
society, but at a much reduced level; ie. while the 
Government would dominate much of supply and demand, a 
larger proportion of discretionary post-tax income would 
remain at the disposal of the consumer than would be 
possible in a society where direct and "total" controls 
were devised and imposed. This would strike a balance 
between the needs of a society engaged in total war and the 
political and economic liberty of the individual consumer. 
"Compulsory savings" was distinguished from taxation in that it 
would be repaid to the workers after the war. They were, in 
fact, tax credits, the Government borrowing from the people; 
they were also the people's personal investment in the war 
effort. Keynes was concerned that otherwise heavy taxation would 
undermine the individual's patriotism, not to the point of 
treason but probably to the extent of lethargy, and hence lower 
national efficiency. Instead, he wanted to harness self-interest 
to the national interest. 
The problem was to devise "a means of adapting the distributive 
system of a free country to the limitations of war"28. 
Underlying the plan was both the fear of inflation29 (as 
experienced in World War 1) and belief in the equality of 
sacrifice. 
In short, Keynes' plan entailed a withdrawal of excess 
purchasing power from the consumer at a time when fewer goods 
would be available). The surplus purchasing power was a 
consequence of increased worker income from longer working hour s 
required to meet Government demand for the war effort (Keynee 
noted that in total war " ... nothing is more certain than that 
the wages bill of this country will increase"). His plan would 
minimize the effects of inflation during the war, would minimize 
the level of government borrowing otherwise incurred, and would 
_ ........... _ ......................................................... _.-................... -.................. . 
28. Ibid., p.7 
29. It is of note that the Australian government in 1940 decided that the diversion of purchasing power from 
private to public uses was the only alternative to inflation. This had the additional advantage of reducing 
the deland for ilports. The var reached such an intensity by 1942-43, that with survival at stake, inflation 
vas sacrificed for the sake of defence industrial production. But it vas recognised that if the growth in 
loney supply vas balanced by an equivalent rise in productivity then the vorst effects of inflation vould be 
linilised. 
sustain aggregate demand after the war when the Government's 
stimulus of the economy via war production would cease. 
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Keynes judged the alternative to be a repeat of World War 1 -
shortages followed by rationing. The fewer goods available would 
lead to domestic inflation and would eventually have a 
deleterious effect on the balance of trade as individuals 
imported what was no longer available locally. 
Keynes' plan was broadly adopted in the early stages of the war 
and then later adapted to circumstances as that war became 
"total". In the end, taxation paid for 52% of the UK's war 
effort as opposed to about one third in World War 130. Another 
significant source of funding was the sale of overseas assets. 
7. Lord Lionel Robbins 
Writing after the war in which he had been an active adviser and 
economic administrator, Robbins was gently critical of Keynes. 
He called the latter's plan " ... the fiscal theory of war 
control ... "31 where "a courageous use of the tax instrument was 
the main desideratum of economic policy". It was, in Robbins' 
view, suitable for small wars only; it was not " ... a theory 
which ... government has ever had the will to make the effective 
basis of policy in a war of any great dimensions"32. Robbins 
based his criticisms on the experience of the Second World War, 
where price fixing, rationing and control of supply proved to be 
key instruments of government domestic economic policy. 
Total war, " ... the wars of our own age, with their vast demands 
on men and materials, their acute scarcities and their utter 
domination of ... business confidence [ie investment] ... "33, was 
the basis for a realistic economic and financial policy. Total 
war created: 
............... -.................... _ ................ _-...... -....................... _ ....... _ ................. . 
30. Webber and iildavsky, op.cit., p.478 
31. Lord Robbins, The Econolic Proble. in Peace and War, London, Maclillan and Co. Ltd., 1950, p.32 
32. Ibid., p.32 
33. Ibid., p.33 
* Necessities of supply almost independent from market 
forces; 
* Abnormal conditions of risk; 
* The unreliability of market price as an allocative 
mechanism where government credit is unlimited; 
* Time lags in filling supplies, thereby assuming some 
shortages and resulting inflation; and 
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* Unity of purpose - ie. competing funds have priorities 
set by overriding goals of national security. 
Time also had a role in Robbins argument; in war at any level 
there must be a time lag before tax collection becomes usable 
revenue. The interim period " ... must be filled by increased 
borrowing ... "34. 
Robbins' proper financial policy for large scale war involved: 
* Taxation - reduce consumer demand/purchasing power (to 
control inflation); 
* Subsidies - the profit incentive to supply government 
demands; and 
* Borrowing - preferably on a non-inflationary basis (ie. 
within the context of a stabilized money supply). 
Robbins' argument was based on the notion that security was a 
public good; it was approached, and achieved, through political 
determinants. Not even in peace time was it subject to true 
market forces. War required the government's assumption of 
command over resources, not competition for them and 
ft ••• necessarily put the individual at a discount ... "35. 
Robbins' work was an endorsement of the experience of the Second 
World War where the resources of the state devoted to war 
reached truly gargantuan proportions. This experience is 
unlikely to recur since the amount of social energy (or 
mobilisation) required to achieve the same level of destruction, 
via various levels of nuclear exchange, is now much reduced . 
•• _ ........ .... - •• - ............. _ .......................... _ ... ·_······· .. • ............. _ ..... _._ .......... u 
3L Ibid., p.35 
35. Ibid., p.1S 
I 
23 
Therefore, the economic base, as opposed to the financial 
policies, required to support a national war effort are also 
much reduced. The conduct of limited war by the modern state is 
more akin, in economic terms, to a "credit squeeze" with 
attendant marginal adjustments to financial policies. The state 
descends by degrees to its previous role of player (nevertheless 
a vital player) in the economy, down from its total role of 
economic overlord in the first half of the 20th century. 
Since Robbins wrote, very little if anything has been added to 
the literature on war finance, largely because there have been 
few wars significant enough in the last half of the century to 
impact substantially on the resources of the state, to require a 
new role for the practice of war finance, or to calIon the 
imagination of its professional and academic servants. 
8. Conclusion 
Three budgetary trends have been identified in western states in 
the post-war period: 
* Increased spending on social programs (particularly 
health, education and welfare); increased differentiation 
of functions within the state has produced internal 
competition for funds, as opposed to the previous period 
where the few functions of the state (defence, justice) 
commanded the attention of government; 
* Decreased military expenditure relative to both Gross 
National Product (GNP) and central government budgets 
despite real cost growth in personnel and weapons systems; 
and 
* The inability of increasing government revenue (through 
taxation) to keep pace with the increasing proportion of 
expenditure accounted for by the public sector, leading to 
sizeable peacetime budget deficits. 
In the event of any future defence contingency it will not be 
simple matter of selecting either one experience and/or one 
theory of war finance for the underpinning of that contingency_ 
It will be a matter of financial policy based on the existing 
actors and institutions at the time relying on the accumulated 
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wisdom of the above authors.36 Policy advice and decision - making 
will be based on possibly differing perceptions of the same 
events as well as on prior theoretical insights. These might 
include: 
* The degree of personal, social, political and economic 
liberty to be retained or sacrificed; 
* The size, trends, duration and likely cost - political, 
social and economic - of the contingency; and 
* How much the government can afford to spend, borrow, 
and/or forgo for the conduct of the contingency. 
Keynes wrote in 1939: 
It is not easy for a free community to organize for war; 
... our strength lies in our ability to improvise37 . 
............... _ ..-.... _ ....... _ ....................... __ .......................................................... . 
36. " ... to observe by experience, and remelber all circumstances that lay alter the success, is 
impossible ..•. But in any business, vhereof a Ian has not infallible science to proceed by, to forsake 
his ovn natural judgeaent, and be guided by general sentences read in authors, and subject to many 
exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned .. ,', 1. Hobbes, The Leviathan, Chapter V, 
Vol.23, The Great Books of the Western World, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952, p.60. 
37 . Keynes, 0 p. cit., p.l 
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CHAPTER 2 : FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
OF LIMITED CONFLICT 
The following four case studies provide concrete 
examples and historical substance to the discussion of 
theory in the preceding chapter. They attempt to 
locate the ideas of the aforementioned economists on 
raising war finance within the context of contemporary 
conflicts, and to build on their insights. 
1. The USA's Experience and Vietnam 
Throughout its history the United states has opted to finance 
its wars largely via loans, and has been generally reluctant to 
tax, or increase existing taxation, for the sake of the nation's 
security. Indeed, its first national war, the American War of 
Independence, was fought against the onus of foreign taxationl. 
Because loans could not be raised, and there was then no 
internal capital base which could be tapped, the war was paid 
for by the printing of money, which resulted inevitably in 
inflation running out of control. 
The following generalisations can be made about the financing of 
the USA's wars for the last two hundred years: 
* Wars were directly and almost solely responsible for 
accelerated increases in the national debt up until 1931. 
After the latter date debt continued to grow regardless of 
the state of war or peace, not least due to the adoption of 
a Keynesian approach to economic management. This included 
features such as the quest for full employment (which 
Keynes thought was reached when unemployment was 3-4 per 
cent), deficit financing, public works programs, etc. The 
central economic role of the state was to act as mediator 
in the maintenance of aggregate demand. This role had 
previously been undertaken in wartime only.2 
* Apart from cyclical business depressions, balance-of-
payments deficits co-incided almost exactly with the years 
in which America was involved in war. 
·_ .. _· ___ ............... _t._ ............... _ ....................... _ ... _ .. '" ......... _. 
1. ie. indirect taxes such as the excise; incole tax did not yet exist. It vas introduced in 1797 in the 
United KiDgdol to pay for the vars against Revolutionary France. 
2. Kercantalists vere concerned vith surpluses (trade particularly), Adal Slith vas concerned vith equilibria 
in the balance of paYlents and trade, vhereas Keynes specified that these concerns vere illaterial in the 
short terl. 
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* Taxation, as a component of financing America's wars, has 
slowly assumed a more important role but one which 
Americans have generally been reluctant to invoke.3 In 
broad economic terms, wars have been more unpopular in the 
American experience than in similar contemporary periods of 
European history. 
In the first decade of the 19th century Albert Gallatin, 
Secretary of the Treasury, espoused a philosophy of war finance 
which echoed the principles of Adam Smith and the policies of 
Thomas Jefferson. Gallatin detested the notion of raising loans 
to fight wars when the present population was the generation 
which stood to gain most out of that war. He argued that the 
present generation should, as far as possible, be the one to pay 
for the war - by taxation. But even in Gallatin's era, public 
expenditure might be doubled under the impact of war whereas 
revenue could not do likewise, even in the long-term. Therefore, 
war was to be paid for by loans, the issue of bonds etc. The 
return of peace would afford the resources (for example, excise 
from increased trade volume) for paying back the war loans, 
which were specifically differentiated from other government 
loans. The central government should pursue a policy of 
parsimony in peace to plan for the costs of future wars. The 
policy of running a deficit in peace time (ie. along Keynesian 
lines to maintain full employment) was inimical to both Gallatin 
and the age. 
Until the 1930s, the US did experience a war-peace dichotomy in 
the handling of its public finances. Peace was generally 
"parsimonious" and provided surpluses in the balance of payment s 
which were useful in repaying the debts incurred in fighting 
wars, particularly the enormous costs of the American Civil 
War.4 
_···· ••• __ ... _ . .. _ ........... n ••• _ ...... _ ................... _ ... __ ..... _ ........... _ .............. . 
3. Taxation vas introduced as a fori of var finance, (ie. directed specifically for this end), for the Jar of 
1812 vhere 95\ of var expenditure vas still covered by the raising of loans, norlally done by the sale of 
governlent bonds. 'he Mexican lar (1846-48) and Spanish War (1898) vere paid allost entirely by loans; the 
Civil Jar (1861-65) vas financed by the North - 22\ taxation, and the South - only 5\ taxation (in victory 
the North vould not honour the South's borrovings, dOlestic or foreign, illustrating the desire of creditors 
for victory). In Ill, taxation increased to 31\ of var finance; in 1111, this figure jumped to 40\ despite 
the increased productivity associated with Alerica's participation in this last vari see Paul Studenski and 
Herlan E.lroos, Financial History of tbe United states, (Nev York, HcGray-Hill Book COlpany Inc.,1952). 
4. The costs of conducting a civil yar are particularly severe since both the protagonists lust dray frol 
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After World War TWo, US social spending (health , education and 
welfare) increased dramatically and, except for several budgets 
in the 1940s and 1950s, Federal deficits became the norm. During 
the 1950s, 
Instead of attelpting to allocate defense and social needs vithin a lilited budget, the adherents of 
tbis view [Igonsl and 'butter
'
} advocated ever-increasing spending for both defense and social goods 
- but vitbout raising tax revenues to cover these expenditures.S 
The Vietnam War co-incided with the Great Society program of 
social spending and severely exacerbated the trend towards 
increased government spending and debt.6 
Like other wars, particularly the Korean War, the Vietnam 
involvement was initially controversial and, at length, largely 
unpopular. 
Tbe lack of public support for the activities in vhich the lilitary establishlent vas engaged after 
1964 light at first be assuled to have severely constrained the defense budget. But successive 
ad.inistrations proceeded vithout public support by paying the defense bill vith bonds and nev loney 
[ie. increasing tbe base loney supply vithout a cOllensurate productivity increase: the key 
ingredient for inflation) ..• The lilitary vas funded vithout i.lediate public sacrifice in a 'credit 
card" philosophy - because the public did not pay prolptly for the lilitary goods that vere 
purchased, initially it seeled as if no one had to pay at all.7 
Any Western democracy normally has two opposing philosophical 
and practical methods to manage a war-induced dilemma (with 
features of both to ameliorate the extremity of these two 
opposing options): 
(1) To remain a free society engaged in a limited war; or 
(2) To institute direct controls over resources for the 
purposes of total war. 
The financial difference between these two options, as much the 
results of happenstance as of philosophical belief, is that in 
the first, the price mechanism of the market remains central to 
the continued means of distribution in society. In the second, 
... _ .. -....................................................... _ ............................. _ ................... _--........................................ _ ........ _ ....................................... ............................. ,................................................................. -................. _ ............................. . 
essentially the sale tax base. Hence, the heavy reliance on loans to conduct a civil conflict. 
5. 'illial J.leida and Frank L.Gertcher, rhe Political EconolY of National Defense, (London, Westview Press, 
1987), pp.18-19. 
6. See lildavsky, op.cit.,"he last three years of the Johnson adlinistration - vith the War on Poverty [and] 
the Jar in Vietnal .•. produced a jUlP of about 5 percent in governlent share of GDP. Of this, 2 percent seels 
to have been var-related, one percent general federal social prograls, and 0.5 percent targeted federal 
social progralsi the rest occurred at state and local levels, largely as a result of federal initiatives." 
7.Ibid.,p.18. 
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this system is suspended and replaced by such centrally 
controlled features as rationing and price fixing. This latter 
can have some of the elements of mobilisation, where the central 
authority assumes control of the workings of supply and demand 
to channel production into selective and useful areas for 
national security. 
In the 1960s successive US administrations opted for the former 
approach - to conduct a limited, unpopular and defensive war in 
Vietnam while retaining the institutions and traditions of a 
democratic society. contrary to the strictures advocated by 
Keynes, the US government, particularly the Johnson 
administration, elected to pay for the war by borrowing heavily 
from the Federal Reserve and not by increasing taxation.8 
Being then the world's dominant supplier of goods and services 
and with some 80% or more of the world's financial transactions 
denoted in US dollars, this policy fuelled a significant global 
inflation which led the US to withdraw from the gold standard in 
1971 (the "Nixon shocks") and dislocated the global economy for 
the decade following. In 1972 William Proxmire wrote: 
... we discovered that we could not have guns and butter 
without serious inflation. Sharply increased spending on 
both the Vietnam War and rapidly expanding social programs 
at home combined to plunge us into a crisis that still 
plagues the nation.9 
2. Australia in Vietnam 
Australia's Vietnam involvement (June 1965 - December 1971) did 
not require any significant changes to the government's existin 
obligations of financial accounting or reporting. No special 
needs were created by the incremental costs of the war. Indeed, 
the management changes affected in the early 1970s had far 
greater impact on the "business" of defence than did the Vietnam 
conflict. 
8. lncole tax, as a percentage of governlent revenue, actually fell frol 44\ in 1960 to 43\ in 1973; cited in 
Ploxlire, Uncle Sal: fhe Last of the Biqtile Spenders, (Hev YOlk, Silon and Schuster, 1972), p.173. 
9. lillial Proxlire, op.cit., p.22. 
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Defence expenditure had reached a peak in Australia's history in 
1942-3 when some 40% of Gross National Product10 (GNP) was 
allocated to defence needs. After 1946-7, except for two 
distinct periods involving commitment to limited wars outside 
Australia, defence spending in Australia has hovered between 
2.5% and 3.5% of GDP11. This range is as much a reflection of 
personnel numbers and expenditure patterns (often determined by 
procurement schedules) as it is a commitment to any particular 
defence philosophy.12 
The two periods of higher defence expenditure were associated 
with the Korean and Vietnam military involvements. In the first, 
defence expenditure peaked at 5.1% of GNP in 1952-53; in the 
second, defence function outlay (broadly, defence expenditure 
less revenue from rent and sales etc.) reached 4.4% of GDP in 
1967-8. This briefest of empirical evidence would suggest that a 
relatively low level of military commitment involving some 
thousands of troops (8,000 in Vietnam on active service at the 
peak) may account for up to 5% of GDP. In 1952-3 this commitment 
represented 15.8% of government expenditure and in 1967-8 17.1% 
of budget sector outlay. 
It is nearly impossible to determine the exact means by which 
successive Australian governments financed the war. No specific 
taxes can be attributed to the Vietnam War. While taxation 
increased substantially over the three decades from the mid 
1950s, this was due to other causes - such as inflation drawing 
wage earners into higher tax brackets - rather than any 
purposeful design on the part of the Federal Government to 
finance military operations.13 
10. Gross Rational Product (GIP) is different frol Gross DOlestic Product (GOP) because it includes incole 
earned outside Australia and is accounted for on its repatriation. The nUlerical differences can be 
significant or quite slall, depending on the particular country's leans of incole. 
11. In 1988-89 it vas estilated to fall to 2.4\ of GOP. 
12. Defence expenditure vas 2.8\ of GDP in both 1959-60 and 1981-82, even though strategic policy had altered 
radically. 
13. One cOllentator on this paper, MI.M.Ives, a senior officer in the Departlent of Defence who has had long 
involvelent in dealing vith defence finances, suggested that the avoidance of any decision by snccessive 
governlents in stopping or reducing this increasingly large appropriation by taxation vas in itself the basis 
for funding the Vietnal involvelent. 
30 
The Federal Government ran successive small deficits during the 
period of the Vietnam involvement but again this form of 
government economic activity was largely independent of the 
specific needs of war finance. The difficulty in attributing 
revenue to spending in the Australian experience stems from 
several factors: 
* The different organs of government which are responsible 
for revenue (Australian Taxation Office, Custom Services 
etc) and expenditure (only one of which is Defence) 
function independently of the other with little reference 
to either where the funds are coming from (if a "spending" 
department) or how they will be spent (if an agent of 
revenue collection). 
* The bids for expenditure are more often measured against 
competing expenditure functions than against availability 
of immediate resources (the temporary lack of which can be 
covered by borrowing). 
* Expenditure comes from consolidated revenue, not 
specifically identified. 
* "How much is enough?" is not the same as "how much is 
available?" and these rhetorical questions are often linked 
only in the most tenuous fashion. 
Successive annual Defence Reports, issued since 1963, avoided 
the identification of the financial costs of the Vietnam War to 
Australia. Only the 1967 Report commented that " ... additional 
costs arise from the decision to enlarge our Vietnam 
commitment ... ".H Unlike their American counterparts, the input 
accounting figures dutifully recorded in Australian Defence 
Reports during this period made no mention of Vietnam operations 
in the lists of line items. Indeed, the peacetime accounting 
concern with equipment acquisition, personnel numbers, and 
planned and achieved expenditure, predominated. The broader 
political and economic picture was beyond the horizon, and, 
quite correctly, beyond the defined responsibilities also of 
Defence, as set out in various Defence Reports during Vietnam 
(and after). It becomes quite clear that Defence's role then and 
now is to form a unit of government expenditure consuming a 
certain percentage of government allocations in order to carry 
out political and economic policies worked out elsewhere.1S 
----------........ _---_ ..... _------".-
14. Defence Report 1967, (Australian Governlent Printing Office), p.13 
15. Annual Defence Reports have becole lore sophisticated and painfully enlarged since the Vietnal var. For 
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3. Argentina and the Malvinas Conflict, 1982. 
The initiation of the Falklands/Malvinas War by Argentina in 
1982 was viewed by the international financial community, 
particularly the IMF and Argentina's other creditors, as an 
extreme case of a government willing to risk military 
adventurism of the most unproductive kind and hoping to distracl 
the population from the internal consequences of debt (a 
declining standard of living). The war stemmed from historical 
and ideological roots. In economic terms, the revenue from the 
islands hardly warranted the expenditure of some half a billion 
US dollars by the Argentines and some half a billion pounds by 
the British.16 
The Falklands War illustrates two basic precepts governing the 
political willingness of modern indebted states initiating or 
responding to military confrontation: 
(1) The prevalence of alarming economic indicators17 will 
not necessarily stay the decision of a country to go to 
war, or at least initiate limited military action or 
response18i economic caution - which will measure the war 
in cost/benefit terms - cannot be said to prevail over 
"national honour", strategic factors, public pressure or 
political intentionsi and 
(2) Given the availability of "war on credit", and the 
capability of a government to fund a war (by issuing short -
term bonds, short-term borrowing, etc.), severe and/or 
immediate economic problems might not influence the 
_ ...... _-_._._ .. __ ........... _-...................... _ ................. _ ....... _ ................................... _ ........................ _-..... _-_._ .. __ ._._.-...... '---
exalple, in econolic terls: 1971 - first lention of Defence as a percentage of GDP; 1974 - introduction of 
functional analysis of defence outlays; 1975 - introduction of graphs, bar charts, trends etc. While Program 
Budgeting is designed to clarify the spending outputs of various force elelents of Defence activity (eg. just 
what is the cost, annually, of a squadron of f/A-18s) there is as yet no institutional vehicle designed to 
leasure or illustrate the costs of wars, although crude leasures have been lade of the costs of the laIger 
exercises lite the Kangaroo series. 
16. The war also lacked an obvious strategic rationale, particularly frol the British vievpoint. 
Nevertheless, the waging of the var illustrates a point: that psychological, national and/or broader 
strategic factors (eg. the illeasurable but very real non-financial cost of doing nothing) lay outway 
econolic factors. 
17. Tbe Bconolist, 1 Kay 1982, p.28: 'For the harIied business cOllunity of Buenos Aires, the threat of war 
has posed just one lore hurdle in the daily struggle to survive inflation and sky-high interest rates.' These 
included: inflation of 150\, real interest rates for loans at 20-30\, annual interest rate on 7-14 day 
deposits at 90\ (indicating the desperation of the governlent to secure deposits). 
18. In an article on 9 April 1988, the Canberra files reported that in Hay 1982, Argentina vas desperately 
seeking lore French Exocet lissiles (30 all told) and that 'Honey vas no object in the search for weapons 
that could reverse Argentina's sagging fortunes." 
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development of the politico-military crisis to any great 
degree. 
In 1982, Argentina was experiencing inflation of 208% and had 
accumulated a foreign debt of $US35.7 billion, which reached SUS 
43.6 billion in 1983. Growth of GDP had plummeted to -6.3% over 
the preceding year while external debt as a proportion of GDP 
had reached 39.7% (while debt servicing of that amount had 
reached 7.4% of GDP). Despite these statistics, Argentina 
engaged in a war with the UK. 
The Falklands War had a serious economic impact on Argentina 
hastening and exacerbating the slide in economic conditions 
which had been in train for the previous three decades: 
(a) Internal: the government attempted to pay for the war 
and mitigate the plunge into recession by cutting public 
capital spending, imposing taxes on petrol (to raise $US55 
million in a full year), increasing imposts on cigarettes 
and alcohol by 30-75%, imposing a 6 month wage freeze and 
devaluing the peso by 14.3% against the SUS. However, the 
reduction and later withdrawal of government guarantees on 
savings accounts led to an immediate run on deposits in 
Argentinian banks, which in turn led to interest rates 
rising dramatically and fuelling inflation as the extra 
liquidity sought security in assets and goods. 
(b) External: in May, the European Community - recipient 
of 25% of Argentina's exports, mainly farm products 
imposed trade sanctions against Argentina (worth $US1.3b 
p.a.). This was followed by similar sanctions from British 
Commonwealth countries (worth $US80m p.a.). Argentinian 
assets in London (about $US1b) were frozen and arms sale s 
to Argentina were restricted. Ironically, Argentina's 
overseas debt became a tool in its favour. It halted the 
debt repayments owed to its UK creditors, who in turn 
became anxious advocates of peace, or at least a return to 
the negotiating table. 
(c) Monetary: the peso stood at 10,000 to the $US1 in 
March 1982; the April devaluation reduced this to 14,000 in 
April; in July, the official rate stood at 20,000 to the 
$US1.19 
With industrial output plummeting, workers laid off and foreign 
reserves at $US2b, an IMF delegation arrived in July to decide 
how the country was to meet its interest payments on its foreign 
19. rbe Econolist , 15 May 1982. 
debt which in 1982 amounted to some $US4.5b, over twice its 
foreign reserves. 
33 
In June 1982, The Economist commented dryly that, "With its 
existing $US34b of outstanding external debts, and uncertain 
policies, it will find the rates far higher than before its 
invasion of the Falklands - if it can find the money at all". 
The foreign debt amounted to $US36b in July. The free market 
forces of the past 5 years were constricted and the exchange 
rate float of December 1981 was effectively re-regulated in June 
1982. 
While it is difficult to estimate the total financial costs of 
the war on Argentina, its impact can be measured in three ways: 
(1) The growth of its foreign debt by some $US2b in two 
months. The war caused an acute debt crisis in Argentina in 
1982 and private bankers reduced loans because of it. 
Creditors, particularly the IMF20, do not lend for the 
purposes of war. Argentina raised loans on the Eurocredit 
market, a private international capital market largely 
independent of government and central bank controls, but 
one which charged higher interest rates. 
(2) The necessity to reschedule its official and other 
loans ($US6b) coming due in January 1983, only the second 
time it had had to do so in 16 years. 
(3) The decline of its credit rating for risk investment of 
capital from 30.3 to 25.0 (out of a possible 100.0; the 
USA, for instance, then topped the list with 96.0). 
After the war, Argentina proceeded to quickly replenish its arms 
arsenals despite the diminution of its foreign exchange reserves 
and earnings, and visits from the IMF.21 In January 1983 it 
20. The International Monetary Fund vas set up (1944) to stabilize currencies and financial policies under d 
fixed exchange rate regile. It vas also given the pover to provide short- to lediul-terl loans to governlents 
faced with telporary balance of paYlents problems. As the forler powers have dissipated since 1971 (US 
suspension of the gold standard), so have the problels grown vith the increasing indebtedness of lany Third 
lorld nations. BOv, the IMF is the lender of last resort to governlents only and in this latter role it is 
easily confused vith the functions of the Jorld Bank. The lorld Bank is an international develop.ent bank and 
functions on luch the sale principles as a dOlestic, lending bank. (J.I. Galbraith cOllented vryly that the 
IMP is a bank, and the lorld Bank is a fund). 
21. It is difficult to deterline vhich capital equiplent itels were purchased because of the var. The lost 
notable itel, 14 Super Etendard aircraft for the Argentine naval air force, vere already in the pipeline 
before the COllencelent of the var. The differences between the Military Balances of 1981-82 and 1982-83 
indicate the extent of the rearlalent and also the Argentine air force losses: the Argentine air force had 
shrunk by sOle 120 aircraft; Argentine naval aviation had increased by 9 aircraft (the Military Balance also 
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signed a stand-by arrangement (SEA) wilh the IMF for $US1.5b., 
the SBA being a strictly conditioned form of credit for 
countries in debt crisis. Another agreement was signed in 
September 1984 for a similar amount. 
By 1988, Argentina's foreign debt had reached $US55b22 (79% of 
GOP), largely due to exchange rate devaluation of its currency 
and the expression of most of its debt in SUS. Little of this 
explosion of debt could be attributed directly to the war, with 
an arguable amount directed to military spending. It has been 
estimated that some $US20b of its accumulated foreign debt of 
$US48b in 1984 had gone on military spending (half of this 
between 1978 and 1982 according to the Military Balance 1981-
82) • 
Three key precepts of international finance suggest the 
following23 : 
* Foreign loans should be invested productively to earn 
foreign exchange for the country to meet its debt-servicing 
requirements. 
* Debt servicing should not exceed the amount of foreign 
exchange earned from growth in production. 
* Increases in tax revenue should remain an option for 
government to meet debt servicing requirements. 
The fear of increased taxes in Argentina led to a capital flight 
of some $US12b in 1979-84 from private means. This was invested 
in real estate and bank deposits overseas etc. and ultimately 
found its way back to Argentina in the form of international 
loans. 
Argentina was able to continue to gain loans from overseas 
sources, despite its willingness to pursue small wars, 
internally and externally. This was so because the list of 
......... _ •• ---............ _ ............ _.-.. __ .. __ • • ...... - ••••• ~ ................. --......................... ...... _ •••••••• _ .. _ ............ ~, ......... _ ............... _ .................. ••• .. •••• ....... •••• .. • •• • ••••••• _ •• • ••••• _ •••• _~_· ....... N .............. _ ..................................... _ ............ .. 
adds the caveat that all such figures are indicative only). 
22. file, 9/1/1989 
23. 'he IHF tends to use 3 broad principles in awarding loans to indebted countries: 
(1) It uses a case-by-case approach 
(2) Its solutions are larket-oriented 
(3) It does not invest in risky ventures over and above what a norlal bank vould expect to do. 
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indicators of risk assessment used by major international banks 
gave low priority to the impact of external conflict on the 
well-being of the society which requested the loan.24 
The example of Argentina provides a number of lessons for 
Australia25: 
* An indebted society will remain able to raise overseas 
loans for "general purposes" even if that purpose might be 
guessed to include the conduct of war. 
* The granting of loans by private banks will be based on 
purely economic criteria (including the capability of 
servicing that loan) almost independent of that country's 
politico-military situation. 
* The granting of loans by public banks will not be 
independent of international factors. 
4. The MX Missile Crisis, 1985. 
In 1982, the Australian Government had agreed to provide limited 
assistance to the US in its monitoring of two MX ICBM tests; the 
impact zone of the missiles was originally to be off Tasmania's 
east coast. The new Government reviewed the plan in May and 
again in November 1983. Once the impact zone was shifted farther 
24. The folloYing list is used by the lajor private lending banks in the US! and Europe for leasuring a 
country's credit-yorthiness (1 has the highest priority, 2 the next highest, and so onl: 
1. Debt-service ratio 
2. Groyth of GDP 
3. Export structure 
4. Per capita incole 
5. Export groyth 
6. IHF loans and foreign exchange reserves 
7. Foreign debt 
8. Monetary and budgetary policies 
9. Ilport structure 
IO.Labour potential, nUlbers and level of training/education 
II.Ratio of ilports to foreign exchange reserves 
12.Structure of foreign debt 
I3.Capacity for peaceful change 
14.Probability of internal conflict 
15.Minority problels 
The likelihood of external conflict is considered so loy in priority in the financial asseSSlents of 
countries that it is listed elsewhere under other 'social, econolic and political factors·. 
25. !.Duncan and J.Fogarty, Australia and Arqentina: on parallel paths, Melbourne, Melbourne University 
Press, 1984. The dependence of both these countries on illigration and capital inflow and their concurrent 
slide into deep external debt illustrate a sililar future; and this is before Australia's explosion of 
foreign debt in 1985-86. 'he defence ilplication for Australia is that its potential experience of funding a 
lilited conflict viII likely be as luch akin to the Argentine as that of the UK experience in the Falklands. 
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out into the Tasman Sea, it was endorsed by the Prime Minister 
on 16 November 1983, just after a major statement to Parliament 
in September reaffirmed the value of the ANZUS alliance to 
Australia. Original tests set down for 1983-84 were delayed 
until 1985. 
On 1 February 1985, the Australian Minister for Defence's office 
released a statement entitled "Assistance for Possible US 
Missile Tests". Even though it acknowledged that "the Labor 
Government is firmly opposed ... to the testing of nuclear 
devices or nuclear delivery systems on or over Australian 
territory ... ", the Labor Government had deemed " ... assistance 
arrangements ... were acceptable ... " to " ... provide limited 
assistance to the US in its monitoring of two MX 
intercontinental ballistic missile tests ... ". 
Australian assistance was largely confined to allowing US 
aircraft to refuel in, and fly into and out of, Australia to 
monitor the tests.26 The Australian Government expressed its 
opposition to the South Pacific being used for regular ballistic 
missile testing and insisted that the original splash site be 
moved away from offshore Tasmania to international waters. 
Despite this caution and understatement, and despite the 
subtleties27 by which the Government undertook to co-operate 
with the US while not subverting the spirit of the ANZUS treaty 
or its own international disarmament policies, the "MX missil e 
crisis" eventuated. It provides an instructive lesson in 
economic crisis management and the problems that can arise in 
relation to a "security" issue without the slightest involvement 
of the military at any stage.28 
Grounds for the crisis lay principally in the deeply- held 
opposition to the American alliance by traditional members of 
26. the Governlent yas at pains to point out hoy Iilited this assistance vas: no port facilities for ships 
lonitoring the tests and no cOllunications for the conduct of the tests. The lissiles vould be unarled, would 
keep to a preplanned flight path and vould not cross inhabited territory. 
27. Obviously, this subtlety vas lost on foreign speculators and investors in the ensuing storl. The 
governlent light have been true to its philosophy and the vords used to defend it light have been lore than 
lere casuistry, but the financial cOllunity responds to lore than clever nuance. 
28. Hinisterial Release 80.17/'5, 4 February 1985. 
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the Labor Party, the appearance of deception practised by the 
Government29, the apparent incompatibility of the actions with 
Australia's disarmament policies and the fact that the MX 
missile was a feasible first-strike nuclear weapon system. The 
political opposition capitalised on these apparent 
inconsistencies. 
The crisis was not solely about MX missile testing. It was about 
" ... the country's reliability as an ANZUS partner ... ".30 
" ... [T]he whole future of ANZUS and Australian-American defence 
relationships [had] become a dominating feature of the political 
scene ... " .31 
On 4 February 1985, after a weekend of extensive newspaper 
coverage, the Minister for Defence attacked his critics for 
" ... speculation unsupported by facts ... "32; but, in an 
expression of lack of confidence in Australia's economic and 
political management, the foreign investment community had 
already begun to respond to the news of this internal affair by 
dumping Australian dollars. 
In its Annual Report for that year33, the Reserve Bank of 
Australia noted that: 
In February, and again in Ipril, the lustral ian dollar fell abruptly. lervousness evident first in 
the foreign elchange .artet spread to do.estic financial .arkets •... In the aggregate, the Bank vas a 
large net seller of foreign elchange in these .onths. 
In February 1985 the $A fell 15.5% against the $US and 13.5% 
against the Trade-weighted Index (TWI)34. Parliament did not sit 
again until 21 February 1985 and the MX missile debate was the 
first topic on the agenda. However, it was not until 26 February 
that John Howard, then Leader of the Opposition, attempted to 
-_._._-_._----,------------
29. On 30 love.ber 1984, G. Scholes, then Minister for Defence, bad categorically denied that the lustral ian 
Govern.ent vas involved in assisting the testing of US nuclear .issiles over its territory. Of course, the US 
request vas for assistance outside lustralian territory. 
30. 'he Australian, 6 February, 1985. 
31. the Sun Herald, 3 February, 1985. 
32. Hinistelial Release No. 18/8S, 4 February, 1985 
33. Reserve Bank of Australia, Annual Report 1984-85, Pallialentary Paper 10. 212/1985 
34. 'he $1 vas vorth sOle 0.8Sc against the $US in Dece.ber 1984, about 0.6Bc in Harch 1985 and about O.65c 
in Hay 1985; the Til (100 in Hay 1970) vas about 85 in Decelber 1984, 70 in Harch 1985, and around 64 in Hay 
1915. 
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relate the affair to the rapidly depreciating dollar.35 By 
attempting to assign the blame the Opposition probably added to 
the confusion and the depreciation. The Opposition's attack was 
politically motivated; the Government's response sought to 
assign economic causes to the fall of the dollar. When 
Parliament met again in March the consequences of the MX missile 
affair, for the economy and for ANZUS, had dissipated. When the 
$A collapsed again in April (some 11% against the trade-weighted 
index, making a total of 25\ since late 1984) the causes were 
attributed by both political parties to economic factors -
prospective wage and salary increases to be granted to workers 
in a weakening economy.3' 
The Reserve Bank of Australia 37 attributed the fall in the $A 
to: 
* The rlslng strength of the $US, with funds therefore 
attracted away from Australia for blunt financial reasons 
(ie. greater gain elsewhere); 
* tt ••• a range of economic and political factors ... "38 which 
included: 
(a) a growing deficit in the balance of payments; 
(b) suspension of the monetary projection (M3 - the 
volume of money in circulation, ie. cash, or readily 
convertible assets) in late January because it " ... did 
not provide a reliable guide to underlying monetary 
conditions"3'; and 
(c) public service work bans which, by not allowing the 
encashment of government receipts, disrupted domestic 
financial markets. 
Defence was guarded about the cost of the MX missile debacle to 
it in 1984-5; it required an additional $200 million to 
supplement its budget so as to retain its purchasing power in 
the United states where the overwhelming portion of its overseas 
35. see gaote by BoYard, Hansard, COlloDvealth Parlialentary Debates, '01.140 (1), p.(?); the Prile Minister 
adlitted - !be Daily felegrapb, 18 'ebruary 19I5,· ••• tbat tbe defence 101 surrounding llZUS and the HI 
11sslle tests lay bave contributed to the fall in the dollar.' 
36. It is Yorth notIng in tbls context tbat the 'banana republic' outburst did not cOle untIl May 1986. 
37. Reserve Bank of lastralla, Anoual Report 1"4-15, p.l 
38. Ibid., p •• 
3'. Bodaet state.ent 10. 1 19'5-86, Depart.ent of the !reaslry, p.SO. 
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spending and procurement takes place. Purchasing power had 
fallen because of detrimental exchange rate movements during the 
year.40 However, the cost to Defence pales beside the cost to 
Australia's foreign indebtedness. An overseas debt of some $A45 
billion in 1984 became $A65b in 1985 because the currency 
devaluation had added so much to the level of Australia's 
foreign debt, denoted largely in SUS. The cost of 
supplementation represented perhaps 3-4% of Defence spending for 
that year, but the cost of depreciation on indebtedness cost 
Australia some 300% of its then annual defence budget. 
The MX missile affair was less the cause of than the catalyst 
for an economic crisis. It was heavily political in tone and of 
short duration, but it had severe economic consequences. It 
illustrated several themes: 
* Economic management has a very high political profile, 
and in this key element of national security, Defence in 
its current configuration has almost no role. 
* Public information is vital, and bad news (or lack of it) 
will be the determinant of market response. 
* Since December 1983 (introduction of the floating 
exchange rate regime), Australia has been subject to 
intense currency speculation which in late 1984-5 reached 
$A9 billion per day.41 This level of trading is very high 
for Australia's real market worth. Because it is so 
dependent on a favourable capital inflow, a future military 
crisis will require a financial policy in response every 
bit as effective as a military response, to ensure the 
country's ongoing security. 
------------------------,.----40. !bese recarred in 1985-6, but In 1986-1 Defence vas able to report publIcly that elchange rate lovelents 
ad fa,oured it by $1111. '0 retain stable purcbasing pover year on year, Defence receives supplelentation in 
the event of adverse elchange rate lovelents but returns any onSDent fOlds to Consolidated Revenae if those 
love.ents are favourable. 
et StateleDt, cited in footnote no.25. 
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CHAPTER 3: COSTS OF WAR 
1. Introduction 
In traditional economic terms, where military conquest might be 
compared to investment, war is mere consumption. It may be 
measured as a financial cost.l These costs of war are determined 
by its input (in labour, materiel and capital) and by the 
measures undertaken for its support over and above normal 
peacetime requirements. Victory or defeat might result 
(political negotiations or military exhaustion could induce 
compromise) but financially, there might not be much difference 
between them. Also, in the modern age, with the example of 
reparations from Germany after WWI and Keynes' warnings on the 
same, war no longer allows the opportunity for a net aggregate 
profit for the victorious protagonist2. 
In more technical financial terms, war might be only a 
multiplication of peacetime defence costs, as measured by 
accountants, within the allowable limits of the policy makers' 
balance sheet. This would be so, particularly if it were a 
limited war fought outside home territory. Additional costs 
would be incurred otherwise (eg. facilities, civilian losses) 
which require more sophisticated standards of measurement. 
2. Peacetime Defence 
In peacetime, defence preparation can be readily and accurately 
measured by its social costs, ie. the opportunity cost of a 
dollar spent on defence as opposed to its expenditure on 
welfare, public works, or not being spent at all.3 The wartime 
1. Defence is the peacetlle forlat of var and ails in part to provide a deterrent against its future 
outbreak. The absence of involvelent in conflict - a loch lore expensive activity - is then used to justify 
retrospectively the expenditure vblch is consaled on defence. 'his cost/benefit approach is problelatlc since 
it requires the balancing of defence's il.ediate and leasurable costs against the intangible financial 
benefits of var not happening. 
2. It least to the cOlbatants; exa.ples abound of nations laking a profit of the vars/conflicts of others, 
ego lustralia did very veIl out of the Korean laI. 'urkey vas congratulated by the IMF in 1983 on the 
redelption of a considerable part of its foreign debt - after it had done business vith both sides during the 
Iran/Irag lar. 
3. The real cost of defence activity is the alternative use of forgone resources (in econolics - land, labour 
, capital; in defence - loney, persoDnel I equiplent). 
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value of defence, however, is not so readily estimated. War 
entails not only added direct financial costs but provides a 
test of its value to the nation; it goes beyond normal 
opportunity and direct cost measurements. In its peacetime role, 
as defence, war is best measured by its factor costs; the 
factors of production used as inputs - personnel/labour, 
facilities/land, and equipment/capital; these combined, form 
direct costs in dollar terms to produce an output - national 
security. 
National security, as a broad function of state, is treated in 
this thesis as a "given" and defence's costs are treated in 
direct dollar terms rather than expressed in the more 
contentious terms of opportunity cost. Defence is measured in 
Australia by the standardised NATO definition for defence 
expenditures.4 This does not measure some of the more 
interesting dimensions of defence economics, such as the impact 
of defence spending on the economy, but it serves as a useful 
and viable management tool for measuring the direct, dollar 
costs of the peacetime defence function, and hence of limited 
wars. It would appear likely that in the event of a low level 
contingency involving some sort of military commitment, the NATO 
standard would remain the measure of input costs. 
3. Limited War - the USA In Vietna~. 
In 1966, the Systems Analysis area of the USDOD developed a 
model that allowed the Defence Department to "program budget" 
the Vietnam War. It 
••. vas developed to estl.ate the cost ilplications of additional deploYlents .•• to estl.ate the cost 
of various specific force increases and decreases .•• [to) give us a good apploli.ation of tbe total 
------------'"--~,~--"------4. 11'0 Standard Classification: 
1. Outlays on .ilitary personnel 
2. Civilian pay and allowances 
3. Other eqoip.ent, supplies and operations(part) 
4. Procure.ent of .ajor equip.ent and lisslles 
5. Other equiplent, supplies and operations (part) 
6. COllon infrastructure and national construction 
1. Pensions to retired lilitary personnel 
S. Other erpenditures 
SIPRI and USDOD ciassificatiois also include itels separately identIfied soch as R , D, lilltary aid, civil 
defence, paralilltary forces, space and atolic energy. 
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financial ilpact.S 
While standard NATO accounting procedures measured input 
programs (personnel, fuel, ammunition, spare parts etc.)6, the 
American Vietnam "program budget" was instead designed to 
measure: 
* "output" programs including " ... offensive land 
operations, border protection, air interdiction, security, 
pacification and economic development"1; and 
* the accompanying financial cost of these operations plus 
" ... the US state Department, the Agency for International 
Development (AID), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
and the like." 
The program developed by the Systems Analysis Branch was 
designed to ascertain the effectiveness of operations per se and 
to attribute financial costs to these activities.8 The motives 
were neither disinterested nor public spirited; the program was 
aimed at resolving urgent problems for the more effective 
conduct of war. However, while " ... this analysis had no 
discernible impact on the key decisions"9, it did permit a 
reasonably accurate estimate of the total cost of the Vietnam 
War to the USA. In 1984, Barbara Tuchman retrospectively 
estimated these costs at $US150b, which accords broadly with the 
accrued official annual figures published during the war.l0 But 
estimating the costs of war relies not only on such immediate 
statistical yardsticks as the items included in the cost, the 
5. Alain C.lnthoven and I.Iayne Saith, Bow Huch Is Inougb?, Rew York, Harper and Row, 1971, p.2!3. 
6. 'bicb vere also the Australian Departlent of Defence's only leasures of the costs of its war involvelent. 
1. Alain C.lnthoven and K.laYDe Slith, Ibid., p.294 
8. 'It shoved vivIdly that the overlbelling bolk of US total resources vas going Into offensive operations, 
(fIscal year 1968 - $14b. on bOlbing and offensive operations), vlth relatively little into population 
security, pacification, and related prograls designed to protect and infloence the Soutb Vietnalese 
population, (fiscal year 1968 - $O.8Sb. for pacification and prograls designed to offset var dalage and 
develop the econolY and social infrastructure in south Vietnal'." Ibid., p.2!4. 
Inthoven and Slith argue that, 'Without systelatic analysis of resource allocation, the United states tended 
to dissipate its resources on high-cost, low-pay-off operations that happened to be congenial to traditional 
Service lissions in conventional varfare ••• More attention to effectiveness in relation to cost light veIl 
have led to reductions in the billIons of dollars spent on offensive operatIons and lassive firepower 
displays - activIties yielding slall returns. Bad even a lodest part of these resources been used for 
activities vhich appeared to have higher pay-offs ••• the coorse of US involvelent in the val light have been 
altered sooner.' Ibid., p.294. Enthoven and SIIth illustrated the ilpact of costs and benefits on operations 
by flgures attached to the bOlbing calpaign of North Vietnal between 1965 and 1968: 
• losses to North Vietnaa (capital stock, lilitary facilIties, lost econolic production) = $O.6b. 
• COllonist aid to Horth Vietnaa = $2.0b. 
• 'Ierican aircraft losses (destroyed) = $6.0b. Ibid., p.304. 
9. Ibid., p.294. 
10. Barbara !ocblan, rhe Harch of lolly, Abacus Books, 1984, p.174. 
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price basis etc., but also the motivation of the author and the 
selection of particular figures to back up the desired argument. 
Another author, describing the same war, assesses the costs to 
the US at some $350b.l1. But this is going beyond the evidence 
of expenditure figures into the highly conjectural areas of 
opportunity cost (dollars not spent, debt, etc.), social cost 
(such as physical disabilities of veterans) and attribution of 
costs. 
Thus, the costs of war can be measured in several ways: the 
human cost of lives lost or permanently disabled (first 
enunciated by Jean-Baptiste Say in 1803, much to Napoleon's 
chagrin); the financial cost where the national accounts form a 
casualty list measured in dollars; the damage to property; the 
distortion of economic development; the loss of exports leading 
to loss of markets etc. An estimate of the cost depends to some 
extent on which organisations (eg. it could be a peace research 
centre like SIPRI) are responsible for measuring these costs and 
the costs which are selected as attributable to war. 
4. Conventional ar - Iran/Irag. 
The Iran/Iraq War provides a useful example of aspects of these 
problems. Iraq initiated the war in September 1980. It did not 
curtail non-military spending in the early stages and based its 
projections of national income upon the volume and price of oil 
exports established after the second OPEC oil price -hike of July 
1979. The impact of the war itself on production and export12, 
the oil glut and the officially ordained policy of normality 
(resulting in few restrictions on non-military expenditure) 
undermined these premises very rapidly. It was estimated in July 
-------------,-----------------11. Jales Clotfelter, fhe Military in Alerican Politics, Hel York, Harper and Row, 1973, p.3. 'The final cost 
of the Vietnal lar lill exceed $350 billion - including the continuing burden of veterans' benefits and 
interest on the national debt.' cited in Jales L.Clayton, 'Vietnal: !he 200-Year Mortgage', 'be Nation, 
Vol.208, 25 Hay 1969, pp."1-3.; hOlever, it vould be difficult to deterline hov lucb of the public debt, or 
servicing of that debt, vould be attributable to the vaging of var let alone one particular var; the national 
accounts are not required to do so and vonld have little leaningful ilpact on future decision-laking even 
vere they to be isolated vith any degree of confidence. Richard J.Barret, {'he BeonolY of Death, Rev York, 
AtbeneuI, 1973, p.41.) estilated the cost of five years of var, in 19", at $100 billion, to defend a country 
(p.42) vhere the average annual per capita incole las less than $50. 
12. For elalpIe, in April 1982, Syria closed the Iraqi pipeline to the port of Banias; the cost to Iraq vas 
about US$5b. per anDUI. 
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198613, that the war had cost Iraq some $US176b by the end of 
1985, or some $90m per day. Along with military expenditure, 
this figure included estimates of lost GNP and oil revenues.14 
Eventual political and social costs to Iraq included: 
* A declaration of a policy of economic austerity after 
April 1982, including cuts in non-military spending; 
* Restrictions on consumer imports; 
* Restrictions on the proportion of wages remittable by 
foreign workers; 
* Rapid depletion of foreign reserveslS alongside a 
steadily accumulating burden of debt. These amounted to 
some $50b. in government debt and some $15b. in private 
sector debt by 1986; annual debt servicing reached $3b. in 
1986.16 (In comparison, the Australian Commonwealth 
Government's current debt service is in the region of $A8b. 
or $US6b annually - without the cost of a war). 
Two other effects of the cost of war on Iraq are particularly 
noteworthy. Firstly, the war with Iran consumed nearly all of 
its foreign reserves. Instead of having invested its earnings 
from petro-dollars in productive economic enterprises ensuring a 
real rate of return, Iraq instead squandered its assets in a war 
of stalemate without the benefit of a victory to balance the 
cost sheet. As a result, Iraq's strategic future (measured in 
economic terms) will be less influential than had it not gone to 
war at all. Secondly, the accumulation of foreign debt has now 
put a subtle limit on the country's independence and restricts 
to some extent the pursuit of a fully-independent foreign 
policy.17 
." .... _ ... " .... _._-_._"---
13. A.Alnasralvi, 'Iconolic Consequences of the Iran-Iraq lar', fhild fOlId Quarterly, vol.a, no.3, July 
1986, p.a8S. 
14. It vas estilated that the direct lilitary costs of the var to Iraq vere in the legion of $US94-112b., 
file Magazine of 19 Septelber 1988, p.68. 
15. Foreign reserves vere estilated at sOle $US30b. before the var but only $US6b. by late 1982; Canberra 
files of , August 1988, "Eigbt years of the Iran-Iraq var'. 
14. Ralph ling, "The Iran-Iraq laI: fhe Political Ilplications', Adelphi Paper 60.219, International 
Institute for strategic Studies, London, Spring 1987, pI7-11.,Iraq's foreign debt vas estilated at sOle $32-
40 billion in lprll-Hay 1985 and its credit-vorthiness at 20.0; see Peter lorner, The IHF and the Debt 
Crisis, London, Zed Books, 1986, pp.10 and 23. Iraq's foreign debt vas estilated by file MagazIne on 19 
Septelber 1988 at $US30-40b. frol lrab countries lIke Kuvalt and SaudI lrabia and another $US25b. to European 
and Asian credItors. fhe Sydney HornIng Herald spoke of foreign debts to the tune of $US40b.; (see 'Iran and 
Iraq prepare to count the costs of var," of 23 July 1988. Tbe author, Youssef Ibrahi., refers to a highly 
stilled and educated population of 14-151. people vith considerable natural resources. 
17. The COlloftvealtb freasurer, Hr P. (eating lade this point vhen redee.ing $18151. of foreign debt in lest 
Berlin 1988. IHe said paying the COI.onvealth's debt over tile vould strengthen Australia's sovereignty by 
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Iran began the war with higher foreign reserves than Iraq but 
was more dependent on both imports, and on oil exports as a 
source of revenue to pay for those imports. Like Iraq, Iran 
exaggerated its projections of future income on the high oil 
revenues of July 1979. Failure of these predictions to eventuate 
led to drastic steps by the government: 
* Reduction of imports not essential for the war effort; 
* Extensive purchases of arms on the open and black 
markets; 
* Increased dependence on imports and oil exports to 
raise revenue (exacerbated by inept planning in industry 
and agriculture). 
The war was estimated to have cost Iran $US240 billion to the 
end of 1985; the official Iranian figure at the end of 1986 
admitted to $US309 billion.11 These translated into a daily 
expenditure figure of some $US125-135m. 
As with Iraq, the war has been detrimental to Iran's future. It 
has lowered foreign reserves and the value of its overseas 
assets, it has created a modest foreign debt (from a huge pre 
war surplus), and set back the oil industry at the same time as 
it has increased the country's dependence on oil exports to 
survive.19 In short the country, in aggregate, is the poorer for 
being at war and its future as the "policeman" of the Middle 
East almost irreparably damaged. 
5. Limited War - The Falklands War. 
In his book, The Causes of War, historian Geoffrey Blainey 
listed some of the conditions (as judged by the appropria te 
contemporary power elites) that would propel a country into 
·----------______________________________ N ___ ___ _ __________ . _____ . ___ .N. __ . ___ '" __ 
cutting interest pay.ents that have burdened the Budget for lore than a decade.' fhe Australian, 28 Septelber 
1988). 
18. Of this total, file Magazine estilated that direct lilitarJ costs alounted to sOle $US74-91b., (file 
Haqazine, 19 Septelber 1988, p.68). 
19. I.McLachlan and G. Joffe, fbe Gulf Jar: A SUllalY of the Political Issues and Econolic Consequences, 
London, Rconolist Intelligence Unit, 1915, p.3S, cited in Ralph linq, The Iran-Iraq lar: The Political 
Ilplications, Adelphi Papers 10.219, International Institute for strategic Studies, London, Spring 1987. 
I 
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war.20 This paper would emphasise that in economic terms, war 
should be cost-effective and efficient21. Yet the preparations 
for, and conduct of, conventional war have now reached such 
monstrous proportions of financial cost (except when compared to 
most countries' overall borrowings), and the results so fraught 
with risk (defeat) or compromise (negotiated solution) that war 
has become an activity difficult to justify economically. 
Therefore, war is certainly a policy of last resort in narrow 
economic terms. 
The 1982 War for the Falklands/Malvinas Islands exemplified 
these cost trends. In May 1982 the Argentine junta confidently 
estimated the war-related costs to the country at no more than 
$US20m.22 Argentina's creditors, apparently using different 
criteria of measurement, estimated the cost to the country at 
some $US500m. 
The British also put effort into estimating the costs of that 
country's operations to regain the islands.23 During the 
conflict several UK stockbroking firms24 estimated that net 
additional costs to the country would be between 250m and 1500m 
pounds. The war effort was then costing some 1I-12m pounds per 
day so the final expenditure figure depended on the expected 
duration of the war. The idea of net additional costs was made 
problematic because of: 
._ .. _ ........... __ u .. _ .......... _ ..... _ ....... __ .... _ 
20. A var is feasible vhen it is considered it viII be short, popular, victor ions, inevitable and cost-
effective; Geoffrey Blainey, Tbe Causes of JaI, Melbourne, Sun Books, 1977. He notes that the protagonists of 
1904 and 1914 vere influenced by assesslents of the others' ability to finance a var. Blainey also relates 
the following anecdote: "hen Japanese leaders debated in 1873 whether to invade Korea the lain architect of 
lodernisation, Okubo Toshilicbi, opposed the invasion by listing seven ar9ulents. rive of his seven points 
stressed the financial ilplications of the proposed var, ••• inflation •.• high taxes ••• scarcity of funds for 
lodernising her schools and industries ••• raised expenditures ••• troubled to balance her budget. If the var 
proved to be 10n9 or unsuccessful, 'oor inability to repay our debts to England viII becole England's pretext 
for intervention in our internal affairs". 
21. Indeed, the apparent poverty of lilitarJ inspiration and the huge financial costs of the ,ar eventually 
deterlined the direction of the course of the var. lfter 1983-4, each side's diplolatic, lilitary and 
political var effort vas concentrated on destroying the other's ability to finance the var - to halt the oil 
exports on vhich 50 locb of the revenue to pay for the var vas based. rile Magazine reckoned that oil vas 
responsible for lore than 90\ of both countries' foreign-exchange earnings, see file of 19 Septelber 1988, 
p.68. 
22. 'he Beono.lst, 29 Hay 1982, p.14. 
23. Guardian article reprinted in the Sydney Horning Herald, 7 Hay 1982. 
24. See footnote no.1S: Green,ells Stockbrokers - 2501 pounds; Hoare Govett Stockbrokers- 750-15001 pounds; 
Jales Cepel Stockbrokers - 11-121 pounds per day. These vele net additional costs to run the ,ar effort. 
1 
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(1) Estimating, and then deducting, the "sunk" costs of 
routine, planned maritime exercises for the same period; 
(2) Estimating whether the government would replace its 
lost destroyers with vessels of the same kind, cheaper or 
different ones, or more modern and/or more cost-effective 
ones; and 
(3) Estimating the revenue return to Treasury (about 20% of 
additional war expenditure) from increased taxes and lower 
unemployment benefits, both occurring as a result of extra 
defence activity. 
"After the battle, the accounting ... " wrote The Economist on 19 
June 1982, five days after the Argentine decision to cease 
military operations. The article split the costs attributable to 
the war into four categories: 
(1) Unavoidable additional operational expenses for the 
1982-3 financial year; fuel (60% of total additional 
operating costs), extra spare parts and supplies, 
requisitioning, converting and running the 50-odd merchant 
ships: total cost 500m pounds; 
(2) Replacing lost equipment and ammunition (10 Harrier 
jump-jets, over 20 helicopters); making up for battlefield 
wear and tear: total cost about 400m pounds; 
(3) Major capital costs of replacing four destroyers and 
frigates, and two amphibious ships: total costs about 600m 
pounds; and 
(4) The ironic cost of victory - maintaining a permanent 
garrison in the Falklands: about 3000 soldiers, a squadron 
of fighter aircraft, helicopters, anti-aircraft missile 
batteries and early warning equipment; total cost: one-off 
set-up, about 50-500m pounds depending on make-up plus 
annual running costs of 100m pounds.25 
Subsequent to the actual conduct of operations the accrued costs 
of the war rose with the UK's accumulated responsibilities: in 
June 1982, 1.6b pounds to 2.0b pounds; in November 1984, 2.1b 
pounds; in February 1987, 2.6b pounds.2' 
.-------------_._-.-----
25. This paper has addressed the costs of what actually happened, which is that in 2 lonths British forces 
regained the islands. Of course, if the British had acquiesced in the Argentine seizure the itemised cost of 
destruction and operations would have been saved but at a strategic cost whicb cannot be leasured by the sale 
criteria. 
26. the Bconolist, 19 June 1982: 1.' to 2.0 billion pounds for the calpaign and its afterlath. Janes Defence 
feelly, 24 Bovelber 1984: 2.1 billion pounds for total var costs ($US26SSI) or 11 pounds for each inhabitant 
of the islands frol 2 April 1982 to end FI 1984. Janes Defence Jeelly, 7 February 1987: 2.6b pounds at 1987 
prices - including: 1. replacelent equiplent, 2. laintenance of a garrison on the islands, 3. air bases, 4. 
transport and posting costs - these costs cOlprised 4001 pounds or 2\ of the 1987 British defence budget. 
48 
Concomitant with the estimate of the costs of the war were the 
means - and problems - of paying for it. The actual war was over 
before long-term financing even became a concern. Short-term 
options were as follows: 
* Increase defence spending to cover Falklands costs, but 
account for them separately from routine defence spending; 
* Squeeze operational/replacement costs of the Falklands 
from existing defence budget allocations; ie. internal 
Defence reallocation of priorities; 
* Do without some replacement equipment - a possible 
Treasury argument; 
* Institute a one-off special war tax for the next budget; 
* Issue "Falklands bonds"; 
* Provide smaller tax - reductions in the next budget 
(assuming these are on the agenda); 
* Let the Falklands costs nudge up government borrowing as 
a proportion of GNP (ie. increase the public sector 
borrowing requirement); and 
* Public subscription. 
There were a series of problems associated with raising war 
finance. Firstly, taxation would be unpopular politically and 
deflationary, that is, it might withdraw liquidity from other 
areas of the economy. Secondly, funds especially raised were 
unlikely to be spent in the short-term; many of the funding 
requirements stemmed from capital equipment replacement which, 
since it was unlikely they could be replaced within a budgetary 
year, would not create final billings for several years (ie. 
after build or construction). Thirdly, to launch a specially 
designated bond-drive (ie."Falklands bonds") could induce public 
humiliation if the required amount was not reached.27 
The Economist recommended that 
••• to ensure that the Falklands costs do not chisel avay at Britain's security (itl viII be 
(necessary] to pay for thea directly frol the overall budget, but to account for thea separately frol 
routine defence spending, at least until the lajor capital costs are pald.28 
The bills should be spread over three or four years with a line 
____ ,. ___ ._ •• _._ ....... _. __ .M ... _M __ M ___ ..... __ .... _._ •• _ ... _._ ••• _ ................. _ ....... " ..................... _ ............... . 
Costs in the 1990s vere estilated to be about 1001 pounds per annul. 
27. 'The lelory of lonq-unredeeled val bonds after the second lorld lar could veIl dissuade buyers'. The 
Bconolist, 19 June 1982, p.40 
28. fhe BCODOlist, 19 June 1982, p.40 
f 
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item to identify the "Falklands increment". The advantages 
associated with this approach were, inter alia, a modest 
increase only in public spending and borrowing, protection of 
"basic" defence spending and hence security; public 
accountability; the recognition of "tax clawback" in the 
national accounts because of the extra revenue generated by 
capital equipment replacement. 
6. Australia - Exercise Kangaroo 89. 
Exercise Kangaroo 89 was designed to test the "strategic and 
operational concepts identified in the 1987 Defence White 
Paper."2' It also indicated the costs which Australia might face 
in providing for a "range of credible defence contingencies 
which could arise with little or no warning in Australia's area 
of interest." 
Involving more than 25,000 ADF personnel, 30 naval ships and 
submarines, 2000 vehicles and some figure less than 100 aircraft 
the exercise lasted some 60 days, from mid-July to mid-September 
1989. This "most ambitious, wide ranging and significant 
exercise" was cos ted at some $A200-250m or an average of some 
$4m per day.30 However, half of this was accounted for by wages 
and salaries which would have been paid regardless. The 
incremental costs, such as those for fuel, overtime, repair etc. 
were the true cost of the exercise. Assuming the lack of live 
firing cancelled out the subsumed cost of other exercises which 
were incorporated into Kangaroo 89, then the figure of $100 - 150m 
for about 30-40 days fairly intensive activity might be an 
approximate cost of operations to Australia in a contingency.31 
29. Hinisterial statelent 10.202/88 dated 8 Hovelber 1988. 
30. See Australian Society, 'The lalarians are cOling', June 1989, pp.18-20. This stated the cost at $2301. 
31. Tbe other 20-30 days vere accounted for by transport lovelents, setting up and vinding down costs. 
Therefore, the standard statistical spread of direct, additional costs over this period could lean costs 
peaking at sOle $5-61 per day. Costs also excluded replacelent of destroyed capital equiplent, cOlpensation 
paYlents, destruction of facilities etc., vbich vere borne by the British after the Falklands Yar. Also, it 
is not clear vhich contingency is being represented or tested in the exercise; a contingency which is 
supposed to arise with little or no warning should be low level bot the exercise includes a lodgelent on 
Australian territory. 'here fore, it can be safely assuled to bave escalated; but in an exercise which 
escalates so quictly and is so quickly resolved one could be telpted to question its realisl and the overall 
costs, direct and indirect, to Defence, the governlent and the Australian econoly. 
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Since 1945, Australia has not needed to develop a financial 
policy for defence contingencies; nor has it had to confront the 
constraints on other public policies which the costs of war 
might induce. Its financial war experience has been based on the 
needs of total war only and this largely from the structural 
adjustments and institutional innovations of WW 1, with 
improvements and modifications stemming from the second.32 
Therefore, in the present age of limited warfare and potential 
nuclear strike, there are no strict precedents for Australia to 
follow. A viable financial response to conflict must fall 
someway between the experience of total war, exemplified by the 
writings of Robbins, and the theoretical underpinnings set out 
in Keynes, where the primacy of economic policy is retained 
during small wars. 
_ ••• _. __ .. __ M .. _ ..... __ ._._ •••• _____ • 
32. G.Lonq, fhe Six Years far, Sydney, the Australian Jar Helolial and the Australian Govern.ent Publishing 
Service, 1973, p.12. 'These problels had arisen and been grappled with in 1914; now the Governlent aainly 
followed precedent or ilproved on it.' 
CHAPTER 4: AUSTRALIA 
CONTINGENCY FINANCE 
1. Introduction 
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WAR AND 
The Australian experience of financing war has largely been 
confined to the two total, declared wars fought this century. 
There has been no corresponding experience of Australia 
conducting a limited war which has had some degree of impact on 
the institutional structures and arrangements of the body 
politic, and therefore there has been no necessity for the 
government to have prepared a financial policy for such a 
contingency. This deliberate oversight was specifically 
recognised in the 1986 Dibb Report but excused on the grounds 
that, "No specific threat is imminent or obvious that would 
justify undertaking detailed planning in this area."1 
Nevertheless, the exigencies and sheer costs of war have had a 
major impact on the nature and structure of the Commonwealth's 
public finances. Firstly, in 1915, the Commonwealth won the 
right to levy its own income tax along with the states. 
Secondly, in 1942, the States were excluded altogether from 
raising revenue via direct income taxation. 
It would be unlikely that the financial measures attending a 
contemporary foreseeable defence contingency would have anything 
like the same effect as these structural adjustments. But 
financial disruptions might still be considerable, for reasons 
that did not apply in either of the two world wars but which 
have assumed major significance in recent times (see Chapter 5). 
Most of the Commonwealth's efforts in financial policy for 
funding war have been directed into two channels: 
* Firstly, to underwrite the nation's mobilisation of its 
resources in matters such as industrial production, labour, 
transport and communications etc.; and 
eDolt to the Minister for Defence by II Paul Dibb, AustIalian 
Governlent ervlce, canberra, p.94. 
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* Secondly, financial policy per se, which has involved for 
example, raising loans and controlling prices, and the 
impact the chosen financial policy has had on external 
trade, taxation, financial relations between the 
Commonwealth and the States etc., which are notoriously 
affected by government financial policy. 
The second of these is the focus of this chapter (and thesis) 
and is more relevant to the present age of limited wars than the 
first, which really applies to a nation "at war" in the 
traditional sense as it evolved between 1793 and 1945. 
2. World War 1 
The Official History of Australia in the War remarked that, 
!be real seriousness of the var, Its duration, the buge financial drain, ,Ith the shifts and 
erpedients it vould entail, vere all under-estilated, alike by public len and by the people at 
large, ••• financial derangelent vas part of the terrific confusion of all tbiogs.2 
The actual financial costs to Australia were wildly 
underestimated in 1914. The Fisher Government, starting with a 
balance of payments deficit the previous 1913-14 financial year 
(FlY), estimated the war would cost 11.7m. pounds in FlY 1914 -
15, at the end of which, it was predicted, the war would be 
finished. By FlY 1919-20 the cost to Australia was put at 377m. 
pounds, and still rising.3 The point was made that one year of 
war [FlY 1918-19J cost Australia 81m. pounds when its population 
was only Sm., whereas 3 years of war in the Crimea cost the UK 
78m. pounds when its population was over 27m. 
For the duration of the war, public finance was divided into 
___________ H ___ _
2. IIDest Scott, AustralIa DurIng tbe far, Vol.II of the series '!he Official History of Australia in the lar 
of 1914-1'11, Sydney, Angos , Robertson Ltd., 1943, p.495. 
3. As Adal Slltb could veIl bave predicted 150 years before, the financial costs of the var to Australia vere 
enOlIOUS. 'hen looting at the figore of 3771. poonds one bas to keep in lind that the total revenue for 
Australia's seven governlents in 1914 vas only 691. pooods (Collonvea!th, 21.71. poonds, and the states, 
47.11. pOlnds). !be costs of the var vere: 
(1) direct expenditure by Australia, 333.61. pounas, 
(2) charges by tbe Britisb Governlent on provision of servIces to lustralia,4l.41. pounds. 
early 80\ of the cost borne by Australia vas financed by borroving. rbe costs of the var did not cease in 
191'. 'Ixpenditure on repatriation and pensions vas a direct consequence of the var, and that continued to be 
a very heavy drain upon the finances of the COI.onvealtb in later years. rbe total cost to 30th June, 1934, 
had reacbed the figure of 831.31. pounds, inclusive of var gratuities, interest and sinking fund.' fhe 
OffIcial History, Vol.II, p.49'. It is vorth relarting here that in 1908 (before absorbIng the states' public 
vorts debts) the COlloDvealtb had no public debt and had seriously entertained the proposal that defence 
sbould be Dald for fIOI the sllplus of the COllonvealtb's land tal. 
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three areas: 
(1) War expenditure; 
(2) Money required for renewing obligations, Ie. converting 
current loans; and 
(3) Money required for new works and other services (which 
continued in spite of the war - these formed a point of 
tension between the Commonwealth and the states). 
The key point here is that war expenditure is additional to the 
routine expenditure and obligations already incurred by the 
Commonwealth government. While non-defence spending can be 
slowed or discouraged, it nonetheless, will and must continue. 
To some extent then, the level of financial commitment in place 
at the outbreak of war (or contingency) will determine the 
amount of funding which can be devoted to the war effort and, to 
some degree, the sort of war which can be fought. 
Several dominant policy issues arose during the course of the 
war and were constantly addressed. The first concern was how to 
actually pay for the war4. In 1914, the Government quickly 
realised that estimates of current revenue would be hopelessly 
inadequate to cover the war's expenses.5 The initial estimates 
of 11.7m. pounds were therefore to be raised entirely by 
borrowing in the first instance, and taxes were to be raised in 
the event of the war continuing. New taxes were raised 
progressively throughout the war years - increase of the land 
tax (1914), Commonwealth levy on income tax (1915), an 
entertainment tax (1916), war-time profits tax (1917)6, a tax on 
bachelors not in uniform (1917), and finally and most 
drastically, compulsory loans (1918).1 
The second key issue concerned who was to pay for the war. 
Unlike present arrangements, all seven Australian Governments 
4. the var sav seven var loan and three peace loan calpaigns. these raised sOle 2501. pounds frol the 
Australian people, vho invested in the governlent's stoct and bond issnes. 
5. • ••• 1 gave up the cherisbed hope of financing OUI var fOlces on sea and land, in the Pacific and in 
Sllope, doting tbis financial year (1914-151, frol revenue ••• ·, Opt cit., p.4!1, Quoting 'isher, the Plile 
Minister fIOI the COlloDvealtb PallialentalY Debates, Vol.LIIV, p.ll4l. 
6. tbe alount by vbieb the profit in the val years frol 1915 onvards exceeded the average profits of certain 
years. !be rate of tal for 1915-16 vas 50\; for subsequent years 75\. 
1. !be lar Loans Subscription Bill of 1918; the var finished before it could beeole laVe A sililaI 
prescriptIon for paying for var vas raised by (eynes in 1'39 and rejected by the Labor Governlent in II 11. 
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then raised expenditure from both direct and indirect taxation 
but only the Federal Government was entitled, and obliged to 
fund the war effort (by the Constitution and the division of 
responsibilities established in 1901). In the early war years 
the revenue of the Federal Government represented only some 25% 
of the total revenue raised in Australia although this rose to 
nearly 40% by FlY 1918-19. Throughout the war there remained 
considerable tension as the states continued to fund public 
works programs and borrowed for that purpose. "No state 
government showed any resolute tendency to economise"8, and in 
July 1918, the Federal Treasurer added a warning to the states, 
"You cannot go on indefinitely increasing your indebtedness."9 
The nature of Australian federalism is such that patriotism 
might be insufficient to quell the traditional and perennial 
financial disputes between the Commonwealth and the states. In 
the event of military conflict, a formula would probably have to 
be settled which allowed for consensus on borrowing and spending 
requirements for all the Australian governments. The 
Commonwealth would be unlikely to relinquish its monopoly of the 
right to tax incomes directly. 
The third concern involved problems with raising and competing 
for loans on the money-market. In November 1915 it was decided 
that the states should be restricted to domestic borrowing and 
only the Commonwealth could raise funds overseas. Furthermore, 
the states were not to borrow locally until the Commonwealth's 
war needs (for funds] were met. 
Similar problems to these would likely arise again to plague the 
financial management of a defence contingency_ The Commonwealth 
Government would then have to address issues such as the 
borrowing requirements of all the Australian governments, costs 
borne in the event of hostilities, attribution of costs, the 
levying of charges to defray those costs, special one-off grants 
8. 'be Official History, p.483. 
9. In 1910 the public debt of the COI.onvealtb stood at zero; in 1911, at 61. pounds; in 1914, at 191. 
pounds; in 1919, at 2ill. pounds. !he latter rise vas due allost ,entirely to II 1. At the sale tile, tbe 
aggregate debt of the Australian states grev frol 3171. pounds in 1914 to 4171. pounds in 191' and they did 
not contribute to tbe costs of the var. 
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to the states to meet emergency spending etc. The degree of 
cooperation could even be undermined by the apparent, possible 
lack of seriousness of the conflict and the reluctance of both 
the public and the states to accept strictures which they might 
otherwise tolerate in a clearly defined war. 
3. World War 11. 
As for WW 1, the initial estimates of war expenditure 
understated the costs of the war to Australia. The figure of 
79m. pounds for FlY 1940-41 (the first financial year to be 
fully occupied with a state of declared war) rapidly grew to 
186m. pounds. This included 43m. pounds for war expenditure 
overseas.IO The raising of finance for the domestic component of 
143m. pounds is set out in the following figures: (they also 
serve to illustrate the ultimate accounting fate of the 
practical aspects of the theories and policies outlined in this 
thesis): 
* Existing cash balances -
* Existing taxation -
* Public borrowing -
* Additional taxation measures 
(sourced in): 
28m. 
34m. 
SOme 
- 31m. 
a. income tax - 17.7m. 
b. company tax - S.8m. 
c. sales tax - 3.4m. 
d. customs 
and excise - 4.2m. 
= 31.1m. 
pounds 
pounds 
pounds 
pounds 
pounds 
pounds 
pounds 
pounds 
pounds 
Tqtal: 143m .-ILouhnd~. 
To raise these sums, the government had recourse to the two 
basic options of borrowing and taxing. In November 1940, the 
Treasurer stated that, 
Expenditure in Australia ••• on var •••• ust cOle in sOle vay fro. the pockets of the people. It .ay coae 
by loans, vhere a .an villingly gives up spending pover in the present in return for spending pover 
in the futule. It .ay cOle by a systel of taxation designed to tate frol each Ian according to his 
ability to pay. It aay cOle by expansion of credit vhereby spending pover is taken fro. the coa.unity 
by rising prices ••• II. 
10. this vas raised by governlent borrowing frol the COllonwealtb Bant. !be expenditure vas paid for 
eventually frol a continuing favourable balance of trade, stelling largely frol vartile restrictions on 
i.ports and a steadily increasing deland for Australian exports. 
11. COlloDvealth Parlialentary Debates, Vol.I'S, p.al, 21 lovelber 1940. leynes had already varDed of the 
56 
The Treasurer ruled out expansion of credit [as inflationaryl.12 
Ie are left with two ilplelents, borrowing the savings of the cOllunity and taxation. Loans viII 
depend on the villingness and capacity of the people to save, and lay be increased by organised 
effort, particularly throlgb var savings certificates las in " II. Ibatever can be done in these 
vays will leave a very large gap to be filled by additional taxation.13 
In the short run, the government showed a reluctance to tax for 
war purposes, not wanting to discourage private investment and 
activity from its pursuit of the war effort. Financial policy 
was to be achieved in two stages. Firstly, an immediate program 
of financing the war by loans, when the economy would be 
undergoing considerable dislocation as it moved onto a war 
footing; and secondly, a long-term plan relying more on 
taxation.H 
Dominant financial issues which led into policy15 were: 
""" __ "._.MM .. _ .. _ .... _ .. ______ _ _._._- -_ ..... __ .. _--_._---_ ... _ ...... __ ... -.-_ ...... _ ....... _--.. __ ................ _. 
inequity of this last course of action, or inaction. 
12. Inflation has alvays been the threat vhich has bedevilled the fonding of vars: lit ilposes unjust and 
inequitable financial burdens upon the vage and salary earner, it destroys public confidence, is destructive 
of savings ••• ·, COlloDvealtb PallialeDtaIY Debates, Vol.163, pp.6-7, 17 lpril 1940, statelent by the 
treasorer. 
13. In contrast, the Labour treasurer (Chifley) in October l'fl said, 'Credit expansion ••• can be successfully 
osed to finance elploYlent ••• to expand production of goods and laterials ••• [butl any increase of the loney 
volule lust be balanced by a corresponding increase of production.' COllonvealth Pallialentary Debates, 
Vol.16', p.21, 29 October 1941. Labour also rejected cOlpolsory loans (although Keynes had laintained that 
these vould equalize the sacrifice of financing the var). Instead, loney voald be raised by increased 
taxation and direct control of the econolY by governlent regulation. thus Robbins' criticisl of Keynes' 
theory of var finance vas borne out by the Australian experience of II 11; that ' ••• it is a theory vhieb no 
governlent has ever had the viII to lake the effective basis of policy in a val of any qIeat dilension.' in 
fbe Beonolie Ploblel in Peace and 'ar, p.32. 
14. • ••• the governlent has decided that, in distributing the cost of its var progralle between taxation, 
public borrowing and borroving frol the banking systel, it will ••• veight the balance towards borroving with 
the assistance of the banting systel rather than towards taxation ••• ; to increase taxation (nov) vould lerely 
delay the recovery of OUI econoly, retard the full utilisation of elployable labour, reduce the potential of 
our national incole, and consequently interfere vith the full prosecution of our war progralle ..• 'ben our 
resources are as fully elployed as is practicable and OUI 'real' national incole at its peak, borrowing 
should not exceed the savings of the people available at any tile. lny additional reqoirelents should be 
dravn frol taxation ••• , as the econolic recovery ••• qets under vay, the governlent viII necessarily transfer 
the elphasis in its financial policy frol borlowing frol the banking Sfstel first to borrowing frol the 
public and secondly ••• to taxation.' COlloDwealtb PallialentalY Debates, Vol.162, pp.1851-2, 30 Novelber 1939, 
statelent by the treasurer. 
15. there vas also a strong link between financial policy and the lave Hany of the leasures undertaken by the 
COllonwealtb Governlent between 1939 and 1945 vere carried out under the auspices of the lational Security 
lct of 1939 and the Defence lct. fhe seli-official history lists the following as financial povers assuled 
under these Acts: (1) prevent lustralians frol sending capital overseas; (2) all proceeds frol exports vere 
directed into the banting 5ystel and thus lade subject to governlent control; (3) Australians vele (later) 
prevented frol selling securities held abroad so as to obtain fOleign currency; (4) the control of exchange 
vas cOlpleted by the introduction of regulations requiring ilporters to obtain perlission before bringing in 
ilPOlts frol non-sterling areas. See, G.Long, fhe Six fears 'aI, Sydney, the Australian lar Helorial and the 
Australian GoveInlent Publishing Service, 1973, p.12. 
57 
(1) Control of private investment - to conserve resources 
for the war effort; 
(2) Low interest rates (set at August 1939 rates) - to 
stimulate private investment in selected war-related 
industries; 
(3) The issue of war savings certificates - to promote 
investment in the war effort by small investors or 
individuals of limited means; and 
(4) Treasury control of defence expenditure. 
After the initial phase of borrowing heavily for war purposes, 
the Commonwealth resorted to the next phase of heavy taxation. 
The level of taxation increased with the intensity of the war, 
especially as it approached Australia's geographical 
perimeter.I' Nevertheless, costs were such that borrowing still 
accounted for two-thirds of the payments for the war. Borrowing 
comprised three forms: 
(1) Public loans (from the people in the form of investment 
in Government bonds, notes, securities etc.); 
(2) War savings certificates (similar to public loans but 
targeted for war purposes); and 
(3) Loans from the banking system.I7 
The experience of Australian financial policy in the Second 
World War was largely a repeat of the principles borne out in 
the First. Therefore, taken together, they have more in common 
with each other (eg. events, scale costs, involvement etc.) than 
they do with the present day which requires the adaptation of 
policies to fit the possibilities of limited war in the nuclear 
age. 
4. Applicability of Total 
Present. 
ar Experience to the 
The economic principles which underlay the waging of total war 
in 1914-18 and 1939-45 are still largely relevant now (they 
._ ....... __ H ....... _H _______ ......... _ ••• _. __ ..... _ ...... _ 
16. Iocole tazes vent frol 16\ of COllonvealth revenue in 1938-39 to over 60' by the end of the var. 
17. In Bovelber 1939, the 'reasurer stated that ' ••• the financial policy of the governlent is to finance the 
var effort by a balanced progralle of taxation, borrowing frol the public ana borlowing frol the banking 
syste •. ' COlloDvealth PallialentalY Debates, Vol. 162, pp.1851-2, 30 love.ber 1939. 
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still form the base of the central role of the government in the 
current nation-state, eg. Federal Government control of monetary 
policy) but the financial aspects and mechanical processes of 
the systems which were responsible for funding them are now 
almost totally redundant. 
Similarities are primary but few: 
* The roles and identities of the key financial and 
institutional players are much the same, as are the main 
policy tools available, eg. taxing and borrowing. 
* The right of the government to interfere in the workings 
of the economy is established by law and precedent, 
regardless of the nature and scale of the conflict. 
Differences are secondary but many: 
* The multiplication of financial players (eg. the 
international investment community, the recent 
proliferation of investment groups) with strong vested 
pecuniary interests at the time of the contingency; 
* The drastic effect of technology and modern 
communications on the policy-making environment; the 
compression of time has restricted the decision-making 
process and made the consequences of decisions that much 
more immediate. 
* The endemic and pervasive role of the media. 
* The relegation of the gold standard and the once stable 
global exchange rate regime; the Australian economy is now 
subject to increasingly unstable exchange rate gyrations. 
* The novel scale of domestic and foreign debt since 1985; 
this limits the financial options and flexibility available 
to the government. 
* The rapid change in the definition and nature of national 
security; financial and economic policies are no longer the 
mere bottom-line of an otherwise political and military-
oriented defence policy. Finance can be a valid and 
efficacious tool of defence and foreign policy18 or it can 
be, in debt form, the "Achilles' heel" of a nation's 
security posture.!9 
____ .___ M .. _______ _ 
18. A good exalple is the Japanese penetration of the Pacific region since 1977 under the (uranari Doctrine, 
a highly effective fori of financial ilperiaiisi. 
19. Recent statelents by cOllentators have becole both lore frequent and lore pointed: (1) file, 24 April 
1"9, quoting Les Aspin, Chairlan of the US House AIled Services COllittee, "hat ve're seeing is the 
elergence of an entirely nev concept of national security' and Clyde Prestovltz, a forler US trade 
negotiator, 'Tlade is defence.' (2) Sydney Horning Herald, 27 Hay 198', quoting Dr. (enichi Ohlae at the 
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5. Planning for the Next War. 
In the changed circumstances of the present day, defence 
planning processes for contingencies might well be as valid as 
the collective experience of war finance was before 1945. But 
neither planning nor experience has witnessed a viable and 
strategic role for finance beyond its supportive function. 
(a) The War Book 
The 1939 War Book was designed as the co-ordinating instrument 
of policy for Australia's economic preparations for war. Not 
total war apparently, because it planned " ... to cause the least 
possible dislocation in the normal economic life of the 
Commonwealth," and " ... deliberate restriction of consumption was 
not envisaged, unless it could be read into the financial 
arrangements."20 Details of financial policy and planning were 
general and consisted of little more than homilies for Treasury 
to continue to fulfil its role and for the Commonwealth Bank 
(then the Central Bank) to be consulted.21 The Official History 
was almost dismissive of the War Book's financial aspects: 
" ... there was nothing ... to suggest some idea of a financial 
plan," and " ... the War Book had virtually nothing to say about 
the economic problems of war except where they appeared likely 
to be the same problems as those of the earlier war."22 
._----......... _ ........ _-_ ................................................................... _ ...... _._---_ ... _._. __ ...... _ ......... __ ........................ _ ...... _ ........... _ ........ _ ......................................... ' .................... .. 
conference organised by the COllittee for Iconolic Develop.ent of Australia, • ••. the spread of infor.ation 
and of global co.panies leant that the vorld increasingly vas beco.ing a 'borderless econolY" and that you 
no longer needed the lilitary to take over another country. (3) Sydney MOlning Herald, 1 June 1989, quoting 
Dr. Robert Haupt, • ••• our sovereignty is already cOlprolised •.. our security depends, in the end, on 
.alntainlng our relative econolic position: it is not nov cOlprolised, but .•• • 
20. S.J.Butlin, Jar BconolY 1939-1942, Sydney, Halstead Press, 1961, p.26. 
21. Finance consisted of two sections: (1) voting and provision of Doney (fiscal policy), and (2) support of 
credit (Ionetary policy). Treasury's fiscal responsibilities vere to: 
(a) consult depart.ents concerned as to i •• ediate requirelents for var finance and obtain the necessary 
Parlia.entary authority; 
(b) prepare a lar Loan Bill and consider arrange.ents for telporary borroving; 
(c) reviev Budget position and consider reduction of unessential expenditure and increase of taxation; 
(d) arrange leeting of Loan Council; 
(e) consider appointlent of lar Finance COI.ittee; and 
(f) consult vith Co •• onvealth Bant as to finance generally. 
Treasury's .onetary responsibilities vere to: 
(g) consult vith the Co •• onvealth Bant; and 
(h) ascertain frol DOllnlons Office action being taken by British Treasury. 
22. Op.cit.,p.27. 
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The Dibb Report confirmed the above judgement. It rejected the 
need for an updated "war book" approach to defence planning.23 
Instead, Dibb suggested broad guidelines " ... to provide a basis 
for military planning and exercising." The guidelines stated 
that: 
* The ADF would only respond to an overt military threat; 
and 
* Normal administrative procedures and systems would be 
retained while recognising the need for some streamlined 
procedures to ensure defence needs were met. 
However, the Report did not take the next step, the examination 
of possible policy responses to non-military threat, or a non-
military response to a military threat, and did not address the 
administrative procedures which were not immediately concerned 
with supporting defence (ie. read "military") concerns. In 
fairness to the Dibb Report, this is not the responsibility of 
defence policy as currently defined. 
(b) Defence Contingency Planning24 
Australian defence contingency planning arose as a result of a 
sequence of historical events in the early 1970s when tI ••• the 
perceived threat of communist or Asian expansionism receded ... ", 
and was replaced by tI ••• potential threats to Australian 
interests short of invasion or major assault. tl25 Contingencies 
are now developed, in the absence of war and historical 
experience, in the absence of contemporary manifest threat and 
of clear strategic guidance, to fill the gap created by peace. 
They are n ••• to provide a nation with effective defence ... [by] 
23. 'Ie need a conceptual fralevort rather than detailed planning of the kind contained in the lar Book." 
Dibb rejected it for tvo reasons: (1) the next conflict involving Australia light never be declared; and (2) 
the conflict lay not require the total COllitlent of the nation's resources. See the Dibb Report, pp.94 -96. 
24. fo linilize future strategic uncertainty, contingencies have been introduced into the defence planning 
process. But, their prediction of events is arguable and they rely on an extrapolation of cUlrent and likely 
trends. fhe only tvo definite aspects of contingencies are: (1) they viII happen in the future; and (2) they 
viII certainly add to the costs of the econolY and the governlent. Contingency funding is one of the lost 
reliable and 'knovable' tools the defence planner has , yet it appears to be unutilised. In the 1981-82 fiscal 
year, the British Governlent had set aside 2.4b pounds for contingencies (not necessarily for var-related 
elergenciesi COllon contingencies include pay rises, unexpected procurelent bills etc.) and flexibility to 
borrov up to 2 billion pounds as veIl before its econolic policies for that year vere breached. These 
contingency funds alply covered the costs of the Falklands 'contingency'. 
25. f.Godfrey-Saitb , Loy Level Conflict Contingencies and Australian Defence Policy, Canberra Papers on 
strategy and Defence 10.34, strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1985, p.1. 
identify[ing] the range of threats that could a~ise and [by] 
allocat[ ing] priorities for defence planning. "26 
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contingency definition and planning reached their public 
apotheosis in the 1986 Review of Defence Capabilities (known 
commonly as the Dibb Report) and the subsequent Defence Policy 
Information Paper (referred to as the White Paper) of 1987. 
These rounded off nearly two decades in the evolution of a more 
domestically oriented strategic outlook. Prior to these 
statements of policy, three conflict levels had already been 
identified: low, middle and high. Each level had a distinct set 
of adjectives or phrases which categorised it: low level was "at 
short notice, most likely, most credible" etc.; the next level 
was "escalated, protracted", while the highest level was "more 
substantial, limited lodgement, sustained" etc.27 
The Dibb Report attempted to placate the intense semantic 
controversies surrounding these horizontal bandings by choosing 
escalated low level (middle) as the compromise middle - ground for 
force development. The White Paper defined these levels of 
conflict for internal defence policy purposes as follows: 
* Low level - characterised by " ... relatively modest 
military effort [on the part of the enemy]"," to 
demonstrate Australia's vulnerability", "force political 
concessions", "dispersed and unpredictable", 
"unconventional tactics and forces ... ". 
* Escalated low level - " ... more conventional but still 
limited military operations", "supplement or substituting 
unconventional tactics and forces with military units", 
"international repercussions ... ". 
26. R.Babbage, Managing Australia's Contingency Spectrul for Defence Planning, lorking Paper Ho.108, 
strategic and Defence Studies Centre, A~U, Canberra, 1986, p.l. 
27. 1 typical exalp1e is the fo1loving: "Prilari1y, there is the loy level threat to the coastal areas and 
off-shore vaters of northern Australia. This could arise at short notice, but vould be lilited in size and of 
a harrassing (sic) nature. This loy level conflict could escalate and involve increased levels of harrasslent 
[sic] by air and sea on northern settlelents, shipping, off-shore territories and installations, lining of 
northern ports and lore frequent and intensive raids by land forces. Such an escalation ilplies a significant 
level of lilitary COllitlent by a hostile country and vould allost certainly be preceded by a lengthy period 
of unpleasant diplolatic exchanges. Hovever, the capability to lount such a threat vith little warning exists 
in our region and our force-in-being lost be able to counter it." Kajor-General J.D.Stevenson, 'Is the 
defence fOlce effective?', Pacific Defence Reporter, 1989 Annual Reference Edition, Peter Isaacson 
Publishers, p.227. 
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* More substantial - n ••• high level intensive military 
operations", "major ground forces", "military expansion 
with external support or assistance ... "28. 
These contingency levels reflect the broad and public basis of 
much of current defence policy known as "self - reliance". 
There are, however, a number of limitations which need to be 
recognized and which are highlighted by the continuing absence 
of financial dimensions, among others, from the planning 
process. Firstly, the danger for contingency planning is that it 
will remain estranged from strategic guidance. The latter 
records the continued absence of military threat to Australia 
(acknowledged by successive official strategic documents, all of 
which have received Government imprimatur), whereas the former 
looks at the possible course of military conflict in the region, 
based on forces-in-being. 
Secondly, the plethora of political issues which will presumably 
give rise to the contingency in the first place, provide it with 
its rationale, govern its likely course, and be instrumental in 
determining its conclusion, will be absent from the contingency 
plan.29 
Thirdly, these political, economic and social indicators should 
"drive" national security policy (they comprise the beginning 
and end of any war or contingency) since they over ide the 
military factors, which tend to be the blunt tool of a national 
response mechanism. If not, Defence could find itself planning 
for the wrong war (eg. a solely "military" war as resulted from 
the Casablanca Conference of January 1943) or structuring 
military forces to meet illusory military-only scenarios.30 
28. fhe Defence of Australia 1987, a 'hite Paper presented to Parllalent by the Minister for Defence, the 
Hon. Iii C. Beazley, April 1987, Australian Governlent Publishing Service, Canberra, pp.24-27. 
29. !.Godfrey-Slitb, op.cit., p.1: • .•• lov level contingencies bave to date tended to focus on the tactics 
that ligbt be elployed against Australia at the expense of tbeir possible origins, the possible lotives and 
objectives of the potential aggIessor, and the political context in vhich such contingencies light arise.' 
30. lIt is ••• very probable that no direct lilitary threat to the Australian lainland exists, OI is ever 
likely to exist •••. What this vould seel to ilply is that the very last function tbat tbe ADF should be 
equipped, or prepared, for is to fight a conventional calpaign on Australian soil. It needs to be recognised 
at this stage tbat the concept of 'perceived thIeat' is in fact totally unhelpful as a foundation for a 
national stateqy .•• the lOP is prepared to cope with contingencies vbich [it is] utterly unlikely ever to 
have to confront in practice •.• •. G.St.Barclay, IRev lational strategy Heeded,' Pacific Defence Reporter, 
August 1987, pp.14-17. 
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By not allowing for the direct and/or indirect financial 
ramifications of contingencies, at whatever level, upon 
Australia, official policy suffers from two pronounced defects: 
(1) The "security and stability" of the region, noted by a 
succession of strategic documents, White Papers, and the 
Dibb Report, tends to undermine the credibility of most 
military-based contingencies, at least in the short-term; 
yet no clear non-military contingencies are considered. 
(2) In the nuclear age, military activity as a means of 
securing national or political advantage, is unlikely to 
operate independently as it so clearly did in WW 11. The 
means, or even the eventuality, of operating against these 
other forces ego psychological, financial, diplomatic etc., 
are not however publicly discussed and not integrated into 
a single policy or document. 
The Dibb Report pleaded for a " ... clearer understanding of the 
levels of threat that we could credibly face". Therefore, 
"Contingency studies will identify strengths and weaknesses in 
our capabilities and lead to priorities for corrective 
development."31 In answer to his own rhetorical plea, Dibb 
recommended: 
.•• that a start light be lade by deterlining [Defence's) ••• adequacy ••• to sustain lilitary 
operations for periods of three lonths and six lonths in circulstances of interlittent lov-Ievel 
conflict in the north of the continent.32 
These studies should be conducted as part of the defence 
planning base, in planning for conflict. They would determine 
the capability of the ADF to respond to military aggression to 
the north of Australia. 
However, they would not provide any indication of Australia's 
political, economic or diplomatic reactions to that same 
sequence of events. These, at the end of the day, are equally 
important. 
31. Dibb Report, p.40. 
32. Ibid., p.l00. 
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CHAPTER 5 
POLICY AND 
-.. FINANCE, FINANCIAL 
DEFENCE CONTINGENCIE~" 
1. Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Dibb Report drew a 
distinction between levels of conflict for analytical purposes. 
The primary goal of this analysis was to select the force 
structure most suited to meeting a hypothetical low level 
military contingency. Defence policy had accorded this level the 
most likelihood of occurrence, and hence, priority. The best 
force structure would also be that one best able to be expanded 
to meet conflicts which escalated to a higher level. 
2. Defence Contingency 
Following on from the Dibb Report, the White Paper 1987 defined 
low level conflict as a fl ••• campaign of low level military 
pressure against Australia." While the definition repeated th 
title without explaining it or justifying its origins, it added 
that it would entail the 
use of lilitary force Iwhich could also be in the natore of harasslent) of relote settlelents and 
other targets in northern Australia, our off-shore territories and resource assets, and shipping in 
proxilate areas .•.. l 
The purpose of the activities would be overtly political. 
This highly suppositional definition of an event without 
precedent in Australian history is adequate to describe a range 
of generic occurrences which, in a worst-case political and 
economic scenario, might conceivably happen in the military or 
operational arena. This definition, however, does not address or 
even allude to the range of financial policies or responses 
which will be concurrent with the event, or indeed might already 
have taken place. 
3. Financial Aspects of a Defence Contingency 
The limitation in relation to finance (that financial world 
~_. ____ u, ______ ,
1. 'hite Paper, p.24 . 
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which exists independently of defence and its claim on Federal 
Government revenue) in the White Paper's definition of low level 
conflict is the absence of any recognition that such conflict 
could be considered dangerously high by the international 
financial community. Reactions to significantly increased 
political tensions will already be in train well before the 
outbreak of subsequent military incidents. 
This is the case for three fundamental reasons. Firstly, a low 
level conflict involving military units may not be seen by 
nervous investors as being at the "reassuring" low end of a 
conflict spectrum as defined by approved defence policy. 
Instead, it would be more likely compared to the past quiescent 
political experience of an area which the Dibb Report concluded 
as " ... one of the most stable regions in the world ... [where 
there are] ... no traditional enmities or territorial disputes 
with neighbouring countries"2. The comparison might well then be 
made for the worst, and probably immediately. 
Secondly, a low level contingency is rightly predicted to be 
preceded by a period of significantly increased political 
tensions. Such a period would witness some capital flight - not 
only of foreign capital (on which Australia is so dependent) but 
also some of domestic origin. In the event of escalation into 
the lowest conceivable level of military activity (as defined by 
Defence's own standards) in which the ADF has an actual role3, 
the trends will likely be viewed as the failure of conflict 
resolution, and the flight of capital could easily increase. 
Therefore, before a low level conflict had even appeared at the 
bottom end of the military range, governmental financial 
authorities could easily be dealing with a major crisis of 
confidence, as in the MX missile crisis of 1985, with serious 
political and economic consequences. 
Thirdly, the reporting by the media, accredited or otherwise, of 
military activities against Australia would be sensational and 
2. D1bb Report, p.114. 
3. 'bieh hence excludes several of the notional loy level contingencies of the 1981 JC~D report, such as the 
planned introduction of elotic dIseases, threats to our nationals in overseas countries, support frol 
overseas for terrorist groups operating in aod against this country, and so on. 
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immediate. It is to be expected that overseas financial 
responses to events will be determined by the immediacy of news 
coverage and much less so by the official press releases which 
will probably not only follow the "news" by as long as a day but 
will only be communicated to the outside world by that same 
media. The danger from the Government's viewpoint is that its 
public posting of the sequence of events, no matter how proper 
or accurate, could conceivably result in being an interpretation 
of, or a defence of, its version of the "news". The Government 
might see the need to regulate (control would be a drastic 
step), to some extent, the dissemination of information 
regarding the contingency, rather than pursue a role where it is 
only one contributor to the cacophony of confusion which would 
no doubt surround events. In the present age's democratisation 
of the receipt of information (as opposed to its oligarchical 
supply), when both news and financial transfers occur around the 
clock and the globe, and when the electronic means are available 
to transfer billions of dollars across international borders in 
less than a day4, this delay in official confirmation of events 
could be critical. 
The financial response to a low level conflict will also be 
twofold, international and national. The international 
perspective on Australia's predicament in a welter of political 
and military confusion will impact most severely on the capital 
accounts and most publicly on the exchange rate, this second 
being also a consequence of the first. Australia, in its balance 
of payments, normally records a capital account surplus (net 
capital inflow into Australia, usually due to high real interest 
rates) which cancels out its standard current account deficit, 
ce the crucial role of the Reserve Bant in the 
lber, Problels of Australian 
lch relate peacetl.e defence 
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about 80% of which is caused by balance of trade figures. 
However, when the current account deficit exceeds the net 
capital inflow, which it would almost certainly do in a crisis 
of confidence resulting from military activity against 
Australia, then the consequences under a floating exchange rate 
regime would be a fall in the value of the Australian dollar 
against the Trade Weighted Index basket of currencies. The fall 
would have most impact when measured against the US dollar, for 
two reasons: 
(1) Trade with the USA, by volume and value, still 
comprises a large proportion of Australia's exports and 
imports; and 
(2) Trade, whatever the source or destination of the 
tradable goods, is still largely contracted in US dollars. 
In a low level contingency the international financial 
repercussions would far outweigh the national financial response 
mechanisms generated by the conflict; in a situation of total or 
declared war the reverse would apply. The key difference is that 
in the former Australia is "on its own", hence the policy of 
relative or increased defence self-reliance ("absolute" defence 
self-reliance or military based "autarky" is at odds with the 
entire trend of current economics, ie. the movement towards an 
integrated global economy. In this respect, Australia will never 
be on its own). The characteristics of a financial crisis 
induced by a low level conflict might include: 
* A focus on monetary policy and concerns eg. stemming the 
fairly predictable flight of capital from Australia via 
either political statements of reassurance or, more 
effectively, Reserve Bank intervention into the marketplace 
- to establish a "floor" to prop up the value of the $A, 
thereby stabilizing it. 
* Intense focus on the value of the SA and its overall 
exchange rate value. In a crisis this focus would be almost 
entirely "speculative" and unrelated to the causes of the 
conflict or the more fundamental and long-term effects of 
ilitary operations on the Australian economy; eg. the time 
lag of the contingency's impact on actual commodity volume 
exports (like wheat or coal)' could well be fairly long (in 
---------------------
• australia's four big export earning co •• odltles are ,beat, vool, coal and Iron ore. !belt very bult are 
efenee against trade 4isluption. '0 .ale an appreciable dent In Australia's export trade (aside flO. the 
sycbological effect, or t'e very real conseqlences of .Inlng) foa14 require tbe sinllng of a lot of shipping 
- little of whleb voold be Australian-owned - In which case the conflict vould be no longer low level or 
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months) compared to the immediate impact on their value on 
the futures exchange. 
* Possible wild gyrations in the value of the SA as 
speculators entered the market and the SA rose from its 
position as the sixth or seventh most highly traded 
currency in the world to fifth or higher. 
* In the longer term, the mix of policies adopted by the 
government in relation to the crisis, the politico-military 
policy indicating control of the conflict, and the 
financial policy designed to both stabilize the exchange 
rate and calm the nervousness of the market. 
It should be emphasized again that the concomitant financial 
crisis would precede the onset of military operations in a low 
level conflict and could easily dwarf those operations in 
overall repercussions on the economy.7 
4. Role of the Reserve Bank 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (as the banker to the Commonwealth 
Government) is the key financial actor in a defence contingency, 
predominantly at low levels of conflict. In 1950, Lord Robbins 
aintained that for "small wars", money remained the central 
issueS. This Is still the case. The legislative power of the 
central bank to interfere in the marketplace, or implement the 
Government's monetary policy, remains and is based on the 
Banking Act 1959. This in turn had its origins in the Banking 
Act 1945 which was the retrospective legislation applied to the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia's emergency financial activity 
preceding and during the Second World War. Many of the features 
and responsibilities of the central bank oriainated in or were 
rt9lolal. 
7. On , Jane 1989, the Australian linaDcial levie, gaye front-page coverage to the reactl 
allets to the do.eaUc vlolelce 10 CUna, 'Boog long financial :Iarkets reel'. Using la 
'financial calality' and 'sbare.artet collapse', the article ,ent on to state that 'tbe lood of the HODg long 
arlet (vas) decidedly Degatlve fandl, the fall would continue until an ead to the China crisis las in 
slgU ••• buyers vere gaabllng OB ,events, witb lorlal lDvestlent criteria "colp1etelyoat the ,hdo,". 1 
stockbroker las guoted as saying that It v08ld 'cleate the ' IVIong lessage' vod,d-vide for BOD9 !Kong as an 
international finalcial centre'. the thrust of the artIcle confirled tbe close lint betveen political events 
financial respoDses, tbe speed of tbefiDiDcial respoBse, Ue 1001 for specolatlol, rOlour and hearsay in 
lace of Infonation, ana the lact of conholvbich tbe authorities could exercise in the sbort-tell (ie. 
leasured In days}. 
bins, fbe 'CODOlic Plohle. in Peace and far, "aclillaD and Co.Ltd., Londol, 1950, D.l1. 
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significantly developed during this total war.9 Therefore, many 
of the functions carried out by the Commonwealth Bank during 
1939-45 (for example, the mobilisation of present and future 
liquid assets, price control, control of savIngs), would be both 
irrelevant to low level contingency and inimical to the cIvIl 
liberties of the population as a whole. But the primary function 
of the central bank would remain valid: ..... to regulate the 
amount of money available to the community in such a way as to 
promote the ordered development of economic resources."l 
In the Parliamentary debates of 1951 and 1959 leading up to the 
formation of the Reserve Bank of Australia as the new central 
bank (the Commonwealth Bank could no longer lead a double life 
as a central and a trading bank, Ie. setting the rules for the 
banking players and then competing wIth them), defence 
requirements were ignored or overlooked. ThIs is understandable 
given that in normal, peacetIme cIrcumstances the economics of 
defence activity is broadly a matter of qovernment fiscal or 
public spending policy_ Therefore an increase In defence 
activities and requIrements, regardless of the cause, level (up 
to a point), or type of conflict, would be treated simply as an 
increase in government expenditure and once justified as 
necessary would receive no special measures of accountability. 
The financial crisis might arise only In terms of the method of 
acquiring the funds in the first place. 
Treasurer Fadden, on 24 october 1951, stated that 
••• the celtral baltvn} allays bave ,aaeQoate capacity todealvltb ,t 
fluctuatloDsll 11 basic IOletary cODaltlols that are apt t 
1 alsu, 11 of tle country's 
el, un, 
lanning 
sIble fOI 
The Reserve Bank was given responsibility for: 
(1) Effective control of credit (governs interest rates 
throughout the economy); 
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(2) CentralIsed cash reserves (inc 
Deposits, the compulsory savlnQs 0 
ith the Reserve Bank); 
ualoq statutory Reserve 
private trading banks 
(3) Financial stability. 
These three functional responsibilities contribute to an 
understanding of the four basic activities that the Reserve Bank 
could carry out during a defence contingency: 
(1) Reassurance of investors, domestic as well as foreign. 
This could be achieved by public statements of confidence 
or the more tangIble raising of interest rates on 
Australian Government Securities above the level the market 
would be prepared or allowed to offer (control of credit). 
(2) Open-market operations (ie. the buying and/or selling 
of currencies by the Reserve Bank) to maintain exchange 
rate stability of the $A. This would facilitate for example 
the continued smooth operation of contracts negotiations 
involving exports and imports. 
(3) Sale of Treasury bills to the public, or direct lending 
to the Government to finance the cost of military 
operations - results in an increase in the Public sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), or an increase in the 
public's debt to itself in the future. 
(4) Use of the statutory Reserve Deposits, or even an 
increase in their ratio of about 5% of total private bank 
liquid assets, to fund short-term financial necessities 
associated with the defence contingency (these reserves 
ere estimated at some $3.6b. in 1988).11 
The role of the Reserve Bank would be vital to the financial 
control and management of monetary policy during a low level 
conflict especially if it co-incided with the Government's 
attempt to avoid making alterations to its fiscal policies. The 
latter would be a clear signal to financial markets and 
investors that the conflict might be more serious and/or no 
onger as low level as the government was trylnQ to maintain. 
he Reserve Bank still controls credit and centralized cas h 
t the tile of the 1988 .. 19 Bu4get (see the 
CO-DDt tbis 'casb' relalns. 
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reserves; however, the 1983-84 Annual Report14 noted that 
" ... the concurrent removal of most exchange controls [effective 
on 12 December 1983] reduced official influence in foreign 
exchange transactions ... " .15 
The Reserve Bank still has an explicit legal right to manage 
Australia's exchange rate if required and retains a supervisory 
role requiring private banks to consult it on, and to operate 
within, prudential matters (ie. central bank policy worked out 
in close consultation with the Government) determined by the 
Bank. Thus, in this case, in the event of a crash of the $A 
resulting from loss of investor confidence due to military 
conflict involving Australial', the Reserve Bank could 
conceivably staunch the capital outflow within twenty-four 
hours. The decision to do so would, of course, be subject to 
other economic and political considerations. Arguments against 
intervention are similar to those which caution highly indebted 
countries from reneging on their debt repayments. 
Firstly, the falling $A would lower the value of the capital 
currently invested in the country, a decline which might not be 
counterbalanced by an attempted and commensurate rise in 
interest rates (to be engineered by the Reserve Bank in 
consultation with the Government). Therefore, those investors 
who did not redeem their investments at the earliest opportunity 
upon receipt of news of the unstable strategic environment would 
be tempted to leave their investments in the country rather than 
accept the large losses which a late withdrawal of funds might 
entail. The motive would not be patriotic since finance seldom 
recognizes abstractions beyond real rate of return; the motive 
would be to ride out the crisis and await the rise of the value 
of the $A. This is called letting the market sort itself out, an 
heroic course of non-action by a government believing in the 
-----
14. Reserve Bank of Australia JnDual Report 19'3-84, lustral ian Governlent Publishing Service, Sydney, 1984, 
pp.1-2. 
15. textbook problels with variable exchange rates include: (1) sacrifice of convenience frol not bavin9 the 
sale unit of .onetary account; (21 added uncertainty for traders of exported/ilported goods; (3) speculative 
lovelent of short-terl capital which can destabilize the currency. 
16. 1 fall in the value of the $1 bas two very il.ediate effects: (I) lustralia's foreign debt - denoted 
lainly in $US - rises sharply; and (2) Australia's power to purchase overseas equiplent (eg. replacelent 
111itarl hardware) declines sharply. 
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"invisible hand" of Adam Smith. 
Secondly, overt intervention in the marketplace by legal means, 
such as rescinding the rights of currency dealers to trade, 
might be interpreted by investors as a loss of control by the 
government in the face of the crisis; this loss of control could 
be military or political. It would be far better that the 
Reserve Bank intervene on behalf of the $A, buying them 
discretely through normal open-market operations. It could even 
engage its overseas counterparts, like the Federal Reserve Bank 
of America, to also buy $As (the financial equivalent of 
invoking the ANZUS Treaty). 
Thirdly, if the Reserve Bank were to intervene in the market, 
then it could discourage future investors from entering the 
Australian market, either from the stock exchange or from buying 
Australian Government bonds or securities (the money market). 
Since Australia depends heavily on capital inflow then the 
powers of the Reserve Bank to intervene in the market in a low 
level contingency would be used neither lightly nor immediately. 
Much would depend on the movements of the $A. 
Against these arguments is the telling argument that the 
government might be dealing effectively with the defence of the 
country, particularly if some casualties had been sustained. 
However, in a low level contingency there are certain 
limitations to the efficacy of military action as a tool for 
resolving the problem: 
* The government is tasked to provide for the national 
security of the country, which transcends the narrow 
military functions of countering the obvious and 
transparent movements of the "enemy" over a geographical 
environment. It also has to defend the institutional and 
national interests of the country (which includes the $A). 
* Despite the caution and imprecision attached to 
definitions of low level contingency in approved defence 
policy, nevertheless it is clearly recognized that its 
central feature is its marginality to the overall well -
being of the country. It can become central at this stage 
only in the psychological sense or the political sense (the 
Australian Government may make it central by virtue of its 
reaction or over-reaction). 
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* Escalation of a low level contingency is not inevitable 
either in scale or over time. Therefore the role of the 
military would be confined to cautious activity perhaps 
surpassed by the feverish activity occurring in economic 
and diplomatic circles. 
In financial terms, the Government would probably find that its 
best overall financial policy might be monetary17, for defending 
the position of the economy, and sufficient fiscal adjustments 
to accommodate the increased military requirements for 
containing the level of the contingency (these would of 
themselves probably be so small - in the region of tens of 
millions of $As initially - that they could be absorbed through 
the normal administrative channels). Monetary policy in this 
sense means varying the quantity of money in circulation or 
altering the cost of credit. The means of doing so are twofold: 
firstly, discount policy (changes in central bank's lending 
rate) and open-market operations (buying/selling government 
notes to increase/decrease the amount of money in circulation). 
They could also create a credit squeeze by capping the amount of 
available for loans; the purpose of this restrictive monetary 
policy would be to balance the government's own plans for 
increased spending on defence related items. If not undertaken, 
it could easily lead to a sudden and significant expansion in 
the money supply and, very quickly, inflation. 
5. Escalated Low Level Contingency 
A low level conflict could become more violent and serious 
(depth), remain at the same level but become more widespread 
(breadth) or linger over a protracted period of time with or 
without one or other of the two developments above. In this last 
case, escalation could depend also on the reactions of the 
Australian Government as pressures by the political processes to 
"do something" about the crisis increased. This escalated low 
level conflict!8 with " ... the attacker supplementing or 
17. !be advantages vitb lonetary policy In a lov level contingency are that it can be quict, inforlal and 
does Dot require legislation. Tberefore, at this stage, fiscal policy lust suffer the leverse, ie. it is 
slov, forlal, annual and requires the involve.ent of the Parllatent. 
18. 'hen this stage of contingency definition vas labelled as 'ledlul' it could still be .aintained for force 
structure purposes that the contingency could be entered Into at tbis level. Rovever, the 'hite Paper 1917 
r 
~ 
" 
. 
'I 
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substituting unconventional tactics and forces with military 
units prepared to confront our forces direct ... "19 would 
probably involve enlargement of a volunteer army and an 
acceleration of munitions replacement and production. At this 
escalated stage, as a conflict became much more serious, the 
financial focus would adjust with it. Monetary policy (eg. 
increased interest rates on Australian Government Securities) 
would still have to be closely monitored and managed. 
Additionally, the fiscal theory of war control would now likely 
come into play - how the state is to pay for the burgeoning 
conflict. The choice of financial policy in an escalating 
conflict would be complicated by the investment community's 
assessment of it as "on-going", given its measure of time is in 
days and sometimes hours, as opposed to the indefinite timescale 
alluded to in defence policy. 
In low level conflict the Reserve Bank of Australia would be the 
prime actor in handling day-to-day monetary policy and 
maintaining Australia's financial credibility, via open-market 
operations, in the international arena. The prime task would be 
to maintain the stability of Australia's currency. As the 
conflict endured and/or escalated up the hypothetical 
contingency spectrum, the primacy of this task would be replaced 
by the equally important one of coping with the financial 
demands of the crisis. These demands would not yet be strains; 
if a crisis were to peter out after some six months (the limit 
set by Dibb for initial military studies) the extra operational, 
fuel and maintenance costs could be absorbed through normal 
supplementation within existing administrative machinery and 
processes . 
However, for an unresolved crisis which both escalated and 
endured, the executive of the government would have to seek 
means to pay for this unbudgeted expense. In Robbins' "small 
wars", money remains the central issue - as it often is in 
---_._-_ ..... _--........ _ ...._ .... _ ..... _-_ .. _ .. __ ... _ ..... _ .. _ ....................... _. __ ............ -_ .............. _ ......... _._ .............. _ ... _ ... _.-_ .......... __ ._ ... __ ..... -_ ........................ -
larked a signal shift in policy debate; a lediul level contingency was only an escalation of a loy level one 
and logically could only proceed frol one. !berefore, a loy level contingency bad to happen fiIst, whatever 
the consequent course of the conflict. 
19. rbite Paper 1987, pp.24-2S. 
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peacetime. By adopting a policy of "business as usual", 20 the 
government would be seeking to downplay its concern. It would 
seek at this stage to keep overall monetary, fiscal and defence 
policy both under control and co-ordinated. It would be folly to 
interfere with the entire basis of production and distribution 
in the economy solely to resolve a conflict which, even at this 
stage, would likely have had very limited impact on the totality 
of Australian society. Assuming a successful stabilization of 
the currency by the Reserve Bank, the fiscal options21 availabl e 
to the Government would include the following: 
* Internal reallocation of Federal Government expenditure 
from non-defence functions to defence; 
* Borrowing from the public (deficit consequences - but 
non-inflationary because it absorbs purchasing power from 
the public, which otherwise might have been spent on 
consumer goods); 
* Borrowing from the Reserve Bank (deficit and inflationary 
consequences - consists mainly in the printing of currency 
and a rise in the base money supply); 
* Increased taxation; 
* Borrowing from overseas; and 
* A combination of the above. 
The first is feasible in the long-term only, because of heavy 
government contractual obligations for social programs, debt 
recovery and wages/salaries etc., entered into years ahead of 
the event in question. There are also legal problems associated 
with transferring monies from one appropriation to another 
within anyone budget year, and such action could contradict the 
government's own policy of playing down the conflict for the 
sake of investor confidence. 
Increased taxation at this stage of the conflict, escalated low 
-----"--"-- ---"--
20. this phrase vas coined by the British Governlent in August 1914. It began as a conscious policy but vas 
reduced to a slogan by Decelber 1916 vhen Lloyd George becale Prile Hinister. Its validity suffered severely 
as a result of literal business as usual vith the lunitions scandal of 1915 and the excess var profits lade 
by lanufacturers throughout that var. 
21. Fiscal policy is broadly the governlent's ovn spending, vblch divides into expenditure and revenue (in a 
norlal budget year). The resultIng sub-problel is vhen expenditure exceeds revenue vhich it vould allost 
certainly do in the event of conflict. The three functions of fiscal policy are : (1) regulate the level of 
econolic activity, the price level and the balance of paYlents; (2) allocate resources betveen the public and 
private sectors; and (3) influence the distribution of incole and vealth via taxation and social spending. 
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level contingency, which defence policy maintains the ADF should 
be able to counter essentially from the force - in-being22, would 
not be feasible either. Taxation is unpopular at the best of 
times; increased taxation more so. Taxation is also central to 
the life of civilized society whereas the defining 
characteristics of an escalated low level contingency keep it 
peripheral to the essential functions, as opposed to the 
political outlook, of society. To raise new taxes would be quite 
simple administratively but divisive, and an admission of the 
seriousness of the conflict from the government's viewpoint. 
The most probable solution to the government's need for 
immediate and sizeable additional funds for increased military 
operations would be to borrow, either from the Reserve Bank 
(which prints the money and gives it to the government to 
spend/meet its bills as they fall due), or from the public (the 
Reserve Bank sells Treasury bonds to the public and forwards the 
proceeds to the government). In either case the deficit is 
increased. Adam Smith is reported to have said that there is 
plenty of ruin in a nation, meaning that, if necessary, a nation 
can afford to impoverish itself to ensure its own survival, its 
impoverished survival being its legacy to posterity. But in the 
case of an escalated low level contingency the margin of 
conflict does not encroach on the existence of the nation per 
see Therefore, the financial responses should be discrete, 
effective and indiscriminate in the sharing of the sacrifice. 
Borrowing is the best means to accomplish this end, at least in 
the short-term. 
Because escalation, as defined here, assumes the form of a 
limited war ("military units prepared to confront our forces 
direct") but falls short of extremes involving the "ruin of a 
nation"23, the level of additional tolerable debt raised to 
22 •• bite Paper 1917, p.2S. 
23. Dr.H.lissinger defined lillted war as one • ••• fought for specific political objectives which, by their 
very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force e.ployed and the goal to be attained. It 
reflects an atte.pt to affect the opponent's vIII, not to crush it, to late the conditions to be ilposed seea 
lore attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for coaplete annihilation.' 
frol B.I. Kissinger, IDclear 'eapoDs and foreiqn Policy, Harper for CouncIl on Foreign Relations, Nev Yort, 
1957, p.108. 
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sustain its conduct would depend on such economic factors as the 
current level of overseas debt24, the Federal Government's 
portion of the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) at 
that time, management of the exchange rate and possibly and most 
importantly, a foreseeable end to the conflict. A protracted low 
level conflict or one that threatened to burst out unexpectedly 
or randomly, even for quite short periods of time, has the 
potential to cause a haemorrhaging of Australia's financial 
position. 
6. Role of the Treasury 
The functions of the Treasury are normally devoted to the 
presentation of the annual budget (and recently the April/May 
Economic statements) and economic analysis of the trends in the 
Australian economy. In the event of a defence contingency it 
would continue to advise the government by advocating those 
economic policies best suited to the prevailing politico-
military situation. 
In the event of a contingency of any sort, Treasury would expect 
the following to occur but not necessarily in this order25: 
* The $A and investment would fall almost immediately; 
* This very fast market reaction would be tempered by the 
public utterances of Australia's key investors and trading 
partners, especially the USA and Japan; 
* Perceptions of the course of the contingency would depend 
heavily on strong political leadership; both media and 
financial interests would respond to this leadership; 
* Leadership would be taken over by a "war cabinet" which 
would determine overall national security policy (as 
adopted in the UK during the Falklands conflict); 
24. Gross foreign or elternal debt vas reported in fhe Australian of 25 Hovelber 1988 as being $Al15.lb. This 
vas cOlprised of: (1) Federal Governlent - $22.9b.; (2) state Governlents - $8.5b.; (1) Public sector -
$22.4b.; (4)Private sector - $i1.1b. On 6 February 1919, Argentina's foreign debt vas reported in file 
HaqaziDe as $US57b. this silple cOlparison ignores several other factors taten into account by bankers: 
Australia's overseas assets alounted to sOle $25-30b., whereas Argentina's vere linuscule at only sOle $2b. 
In Argentina, the governlent ,as largely responsible for the entire debt; in Australia, the Federal 
Governlent was responsible for sOle 20\. Australia bas always been considered a safe haven for investlent 
(wbich vould be reconsidered in the light of any contingency) as opposed to Argentina which lust glean loans 
frol the IMF. 
25. !be folloving is based on an interview, on 9 Decelber 1988, with "r. D.Moole, el-Deputy Secretary of the 
treasury and nov with tbe Australian Institute of Public Affairs. 
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* Borrowing from overseas for the contingency would in fact 
be done in the name of funding general expenditure; lending 
is not normally provided specifically for underwriting 
wars, unless the vested interests of the lender were 
clearly involved - which would be unlikely in a 
contingency; 
* Despite the financial policies pursued by the government, 
great stock would be placed on the ability of the ADF to 
control, if not resolve, the contingency. 
The advice of Treasury would be advocated most strongly in a 
"war cabinet"; it would be a third source of economic advice, 
along with the Department of Finance (fiscal policy) and the 
Reserve Bank (monetary policy). The role of the Treasury would 
also be to co-ordinate, or mediate between, these respective 
policies. 
7. More Substantial Conflict 
The Dibb Report's definition of more substantial conflictH 
requires " ... defined military objectives ... specific targets of 
military value ... and ... intense conflict of limited 
duration ... ". As with the White Paper 1987, invasion is ruled 
out, but limited lodgement or major assault is entertained as a 
distinct possibility at this level. Parenthetically, it is not 
specified why this course of action is embarked upon: possibly 
the ADF has contained the aggressor at a lower level of confli c t 
and now the enemy must escalate, perhaps through desperation. 
Possibly the enemy has succeeded at a lower level and is now 
capitalising on that success. The features which differentiate 
this level from lower levels are, firstly, the focus of conflict 
is moved from the sea/air gap to continental Australia, and 
secondly, regular ground troops are involved. But as yet there 
is not a state of declared war and certainly no attempt at 
subjugation. 
The movement from escalated low level contingency to more 
substantial conflict entails a quantum leap from 
._--_ .. __ .. _-_ ... _. __ .. _---_ .. _---
26. Dibb Report, p.54. 
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"confrontation"21 into an outright limited war scenario. Because 
of the generalised nature of these horizontal levels of 
conflict, it is difficult to predict the financial responses of 
the government. "More substantial conflict" (still short of 
declared war) implies a very serious military situation but one 
still largely confined to the northern fringes of the continent 
and not directly and physically affecting Australian society as 
However, it would be a 
ould rattle the 
a whole, as opposed to its interests. 
deeply traumatic group experience and 
expectations of the future well-being of ost Australians 
(Keynes' "animal spirits" on which patterns of future investment 
were largely based). The scenario implies that no favourable 
outcome or short-term political settlement is in sight. 
The government would have two ways of handling such a turn of 
events: 
* By remaining a liberal society engaged in a limited war 
(as advocated by Keynes and adopted by the USA in Vietnam); 
* By reversion to war-time direct controls (as happened in 
orld War 11, and subsequently supported by Robbins). 
The financial and social differences between these opposing 
policies are: in the first, the price system and the mechanism 
of the market remain central to the continued system of 
distribution in society (see "Keynes", Chapter 1); in the 
second, this system is suspended and replaced by such centrally 
controlled features as rationing and price fixing (see 
'Robbins", Chapter 1). This latter approach has some of the 
elements of mobilisation, where the central authority controls 
the workings of supply and demand to channel production into 
selective areas useful to defence. A by-product is that a 
successful, short-term brake is put on inflation, the "bete 
noir" of most governments. 
27. J.l.G.lactle drev sil lessons or definlDg cbaracterlstlcs frol tbe 'Confrontatloo' episode: (1) tbe 
erilla forces vere ,ery siall In nOlbers but tied dOln large nOlbers of regolar defenders; (2) lilitary 
ressare served as baclgroond 'Dolse' to the ap-front high profile political and diplolatic negotiations; (3) 
selzore of territory vas not the issue; (e) guerilla troops vere slov1y replaced by regular troops; (5) 
surprise, IlprovisatioD and uDortbodol tactIcs vere the nOlli (6) overt violence vas avoided ego 
assassination. See, J.l.G.Maclie, £01 Level HIli tall IncUlsioDs: LeSSODS of the Jndonesian-Nalaysla 
'Conflontation' Ipisode, 1"3-66, lorling Paper Bo.105, strategic and Defence Studies Centre, lBU, CaDbe[[a, 
1"6, DD.24-2S. 
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As an escalated conflict developed symptoms of a more 
substantial one, such as limited lodgement, mining of ports, 
direct conventional military force confrontation etc., then the 
government might be compelled to levy a form of war taxation, in 
the context of two issues. Firstly, it could be presumed that 
tI ••• strike and other offensive measures against the adversary's 
military bases and infrastructure ... " had either failed or not 
been countenanced28. Secondly, the additional taxation would 
probably serve the expansion base rather than the incremental 
costs attached to the extra activity of the regular ADF. The two 
options set out in the previous paragraph illustrate the 
importance of financial policy, not only to the successful 
conduct of a military crisis (which may have produced the 
particular "wartime" financial policy in the first place), but 
to the state of the economy as a whole. As a more substantial 
conflict (as set out in the White Paper 1987) began to adopt the 
features of a major military venture against Australia, then the 
government would be compelled to introduce (and justify the 
introduction with an appropriate description like "Defence 
contingency Tax") some form of temporary additional taxation if, 
and only if: 
* in the assessment of the Treasury, loans raised with or 
via the Reserve Bank were inadequate to cover the costs of 
the emergency; 
* military advice could not foresee a military solution or 
conclusion to the conflict on terms which appeared to 
favour Australia; 
* Australian foreign intelligence services indicated that 
there was little or no likelihood of allied or other 
international intervention to resolve the conflict to suit 
Australian national interests; 
* with the raising of loans to date, along with a probable 
substantial balance of payments deficit, the Reserve Bank 
were to advise that investor confidence in the Australian 
economy had begun to slump, resulting in adverse effects on 
the exchange rate; 
* economic indicators began to show an increase in 
---" .. _ .. _----
28. The retention of offensive stIike assets in the ADF order of battle ilplies a belief that the future 
contlnqency could be resolved quickly, victoriously and allost without cost if only the political lasters 
vould be as bold; this, despite the obvious lessons of Vietnal. War taxation is the adli5sion of a lonq-terl, 
serious conflict. The lilitary forces durinq the Vietna. era vere expanded without recourse to other 
financial policies. 
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inflation, and/or strains, or adverse trends in the economy 
- general economic trends seen by everyone. 
Even more substantial conflict is only a limited war although of 
the most serious kind. 
In lilited var, nations do not bring all of their pover to bear, so that their productive voluae is 
not decisive. 'bat is ilportant econolically is tbe rapidity with wbich the econolY can adjust to the 
nev delands arising out of the specific situation of the lilited war.29 
Financial policy remains the means by which the range of defence 
conflicts are managed in economic terms up to the highest level, 
including the outbreak of declared war. Keynes had argued this, 
and stated that it should remain paramount and central to war 
organisation even in a situation of total war. However, Robbins 
added from experience that once the threshold of taxation and 
borrowing for war purposes is broached, the existing financial 
policy options are exhausted. They become subsumed in a policy 
of national mobilisation. 
8. Mobilisation 
Current defence policy considers mobilisation to be implausible 
and thus an inappropriate basis for defence planning. 
Mobilisation, understood in traditional terms, would be a 
quantum leap above the requirements of even the highest pitched 
defence scenario which is currently hypothesized30. The White 
Paper 1987 did not consider a state of declared conventional war 
involving Australia to be a feasible option outside the scenario 
of global nuclear war. Only at this level would mobilisation of 
Australia's resources, as opposed to force expansion, be 
relevant. Nevertheless, the concept cannot be dismissed totally 
because, as has been pointed out " ... the strains on the economy 
implicit in limited war, are not negligible."31 If the concept 
of mobilisation was therefore changed from one of numerical 
...... _ .... _ ............. __ .. _. __ ... - .... _ ....... __ .. _-_ ........... __ ....... -
29. J.R.Schlesinger, rhe Political BconolY of National Security, stevens and Sons Ltd., London, 1960, p.72. 
30. • ... it would seel reasonable to assule that [lov level contingency) would not require resources initially 
beyond those already contained within Australia's regular forces ••• ·, G.L.Cheeselan, IArlY Force 
Develop.ent·, in D.Ball and J.O.Langtry (eds.), Problels of Hobilisation in Defence of Australia, Canberra, 
Phoenix Defence Publications, 1980, p.29. It is interesting to note that the financial considerations 
surrounding lobilisation are totally ignored. 
31. Ibid.,p.74. 
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increase to one of qualitative adjustment of the institutions 
and mechanisms of society and the economy (with some increase in 
production), then its relevance to modern, limited war would be 
re-established. The White Paper committed itself to a wartime 
administration plan only, involving force expansion (an inherent 
military concept), war reserves and stockholding32. These 
particular tasks do not of themselves require special financial 
considerations (ie. policy sea-changes of a fundamental kind) 
beyond mere increases in spending. 
Even in contingencies pitched at the highest level, mobilisation 
of capital would not occur. Instead, finance would be raised in 
a similar manner to its peacetime equivalent, except with a 
possibly heightened sense of urgency and higher interest rates. 
J.Schlesinger, later a US Secretary for Defence, divided the 
economic responses of the US Government to hypothetical threat 
into three phases or levels: 
(1) Retention of free market principles, for the duration 
of the conflict, as in peacetime: 
(a) increased preparedness - balanced budget, special 
taxes (normality); 
(b) limited war - mildly unbalanced budget as increased 
spending outpaced revenue raising (defence economy); 
(c) total war33 - serious budgetary disequilibrium and 
considerable additions to the deficit as (b) above is 
exacerbated (war economy); 
(2) Institution of price & monetary controls: 
(a) increased preparedness - no direct controls (ie. 
these would not be instituted at such an early stage), 
so (la) would apply (normality); 
(b) limited war - voluntary controls leading to 
selectively imposed controls eg. wage/price freezes or 
fixing (defence economy); 
(c) total war - general price controls and credit 
rationing, interest rate fixing (war economy); 
(3) Allocation of supply: 
(a) increased preparedness - market mechanism applies 
(ie. as for (2a) above) - (normality); 
(b) limited war - voluntary controls (formal or 
32. 'hite Paper 19'7, Chapters 2 and' principally; this is aside frol other instrulents of policy such as 
'industry involve.ent'. 
33. Schlesinger includes nuclear var in this category but it is difficult to envisage the sale econolic and 
financial responses to it, given the speed with which it would be conducted and the level of destruction 
which vould be visited on the country's econolic base. still, it vas vritten in 1959 vhen the 'unthinkable" 
vas thought about vith serious quantifiable logic and rationality. 
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informal), including consumer rationing, and would 
probably include the government setting some priorities 
in resource allocation (defence economy); 
(c) total war - general allocations set by the 
government, requisitioning, personnel direction (total 
war). 
While Schlesinger's comments are not specifically devoted to 
finance, it is clear from the above that finance is more central 
to the lower levels of hypothetical conflict than at higher 
levels, when the role of war finance slides into a solely 
supportive role for the war economy (this point had already been 
made by Robbins). Schlesinger describes this adjustment as 
mobilisation. "The reorientation of the economy that is required 
may be so severe that the price system becomes an inadequate 
instrument to achieve the necessary production shifts, and it 
may be necessary to utilize a supplementary system of controls 
to achieve the desired transformation."34 However, mobilisation 
is not considered inevitable. 
The point of discussing mobilisation here, even though not 
countenanced by either experience or defence policy, is to 
indicate the features which differentiate it from other lower 
contingency levels, at least from the financial point of view, 
and to highlight the seriousness of a situation in which 
mobilisation, as an option, could be entertained. 
9. Role of Defence and Government 
The role of the Defence Department in the various levels of 
contingency would concentrate on two aspects: the conduct of 
operations, and the procurement of supplies, spare parts and 
replacement or additional equipment. Both tasks would require 
substantial and on-going justification to the several groups of 
decision-makers involved. Defence's contribution to financial 
policy-making would be meagre. It would perform a role limited 
to resource consumption. The request for resources, which would 
in no small way set the financial policies to be adopted, would 
depend on the actual conduct of the contingency and here 
34. Schlesinger, op.cit., p.74. 
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military advice would weigh heavily. 
Section 7 of the Defence Act 1903 specifically precludes 
financial provisions. The Audit Act 1901 is the basis for the 
expenditure power and authority of the Commonwealth Government· 
financial policy both stems from and is legally bound by the 
provisions of this act. Since the Audit Act is the 
responsibility of the Department of Finance, that department 
would be the first tier of government to oversight the impact of 
any defence contingency on the public's fiscal purse. The 
Reserve Bank would be responsible for the government's monetary 
policies. The Department of the Treasury might only become 
involved at a later and more serious stage, and then to provide 
co-ordination and advice of a fiscal nature (eg. whether to 
borrow, tax, cut other non-defence spending etc.). Appeals to 
ANZUS would be the responsibility of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade. Oversiting all, probably for each and every 
level of contingency, would be an ad hoc committee of the 
Cabinet (Prime Minister and Cabinet). 
10. An Indication of Costs 
Financial policy in the variously conceived levels of defence 
contingency would not change solely as a consequence of the 
abstract and orderly notions of financial policies and options 
set out in this thesis. The response would include these, but 
would likely be driven also by an instinctive awareness of the 
most rational course of action possible under the circumstances, 
ie., that at a certain intensity of military conflict, or at the 
breaching of a tolerable cost limit, or under pressure of public 
opinion, the government would be forced to "do something". 
Under these circumstances, monetary policy, for example, may not 
necessarily always be the principal instrument of the financial 
policy adopted. 
Implementation of new, or alteration of existing, financial 
policy would likely be based on two fundamental premises: 
(1) The immediate financial costs, based on the level of 
conflict and resulting defence requirements, and the 
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response of the markets; 
(2) The expected financial costs, based on the anticipated 
duration, scale and outcome of the conflict. 
Both these premises would be heavily dependent on Defence 
advice. Decisions to change current financial policy would rely 
to a certain extent on extrapolations of likely spending 
patterns. 
To set an order of magnitude on the possible direct costs of 
conflict levels to the Australian community, the following sets 
out an ascending scale of indicative military costs: 
* Peacetime - Australia currently spends about $US16m. 
per day on the administration, maintenance and operation of 
its defence forces (based on $US1-0.80c Australian). 
* Exercises - Kangaroo 89 can be costed at some $US2.7m. 
per day, although this excludes the cost of live 
ammunition. It could not be considered additional to normal 
peacetime expenditure and is included for indicative 
purposes only. If it were additional it would be only some 
2-3% above normal expenditure. 
* Low level - Australian expenditure on defence averaged 
about 3% of GNP/GOP from 1953-54 to 1986-87 (therefore 
excluding the Korean War); peak expenditure in 1967-68 
during Vietnam reached 4.4% of GDP or 44% above its average 
experience in the nuclear age. No special financial 
provisions were introduced to take account of this 
increased expenditure; in other words, if defence spending 
jumped to $US23m. per day to handle a contingency, this, of 
itself, would not be enough to induce authorities to alter 
peacetime economic policy. 
* Escalated low level - at its height in 1968, the USA 
was spending some $US50-60m. per day on the war (current $) 
or about 25% above its normally high peacetime rate of 
defence expenditure. This was largely covered by borrowed 
money, rather than additional taxes, to allay the 
unpopularity of the war. 
* Limited war - the UK spent about $US28m. per day on the 
Falkland Islands war, all of which was covered through 
normal administrative accounting mechanisms. 
* More substantial conflict - Iraq/Iran spent in the 
region of $US100-135m. per day on regular hostilities 
involving large scale conventional operations by military 
forces. These countries had to resort to borrowing, 
austerity measures and modifications to their original 
financial, defence and domestic policies to sustain the 
conflict. 
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The Dibb Report recommended the study of the adequacy of 
existing stocks of materiel to sustain military operations for 
periods of three and six months, in circumstances of 
intermittent low level conflict to the north of the continent. 
In the context of the above, Australia could expect to spend 
several hundreds of millions of dollars over this time frame, 
over and above normal defence function expenditure, and would 
need to do so without upsetting the overall economic policies of 
the government. 
In short, the financial policy ultimately adopted will depend 
firstly, on the provision of advice regarding the choice of 
monetary or fiscal policies and their utility in relation to 
containing economic pressures arising from the military 
situation, and secondly, on some combination of the financial 
costs outlined above, multiplied by the expected duration of 
operations. 
11. Conclusion 
While the future is unknown and subject to chance, for 
institutional purposes, it remains reasonably predictable, and 
planning must proceed on that basis. Finance and defence 
policies, as instruments of government, should likewise proceed 
from a basis of reasonable predictability, and contingencies 
should be credible exercises in testing their efficacy. 
Financial policy is exercised, judged and refined daily as a 
matter of course. Defence policy is not. 
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CONCLUSION 
Financial policy is one of the key common denominators (and 
certainly not the least important) underpinning the defence of 
Australia against aggression and other less defined hostile 
activities. But it is not a constant variable and cannot be 
presumed. 
The priority given to financial policy during the conduct of 
conflict would depend on the government's perception of all 
facets of the national interest, its military and economic 
dimensions figuring particularly. Military security and economic 
well-being are both central dimensions of the national interest, 
but the relationship between the two, the hierarchy of 
significance at any given point, and the nature and degree of 
the trade-offs required between them, are not fixed or clear 
cut. Nor, as noted earlier, is the fiscal or monetary response 
to a particular military contingency decreed in policy. Quite 
the opposite. Almost no attention has been given to developing a 
financial policy to deal with different levels or kinds of 
threat; nor has Defence adequately incorporated, or been 
expected to incorporate, the financial dimension into 
contingency planning. Its policy remains one of military-
oriented defence rather than broad-based national security. 
Some general comments can, nonetheless, be made about the 
financial dimension of contingencies. It should be crucial for 
the financial, defence and security communities to explore the 
policy implications in this area. 
In the context of a low level contingency the fiscal theory of 
war control will prevail. At some level higher than this (much 
higher since this second approach is based on the experience of 
the democracies leading into total war), this theory will break 
down and will be replaced by state intervention or even control. 
The fiscal theory of war control sees " ... the essential problem 
88 
as one of public finance."1 This includes taxation and non-
inflationary borrowing on the part of the government. The 
purchasing power of consumers should be reduced (to control 
demand), the stimulus of profit should be the overriding 
incentive for the private sector to contribute to the national 
security policies of the government (by maintaining supply), and 
the primacy of the price mechanism might then be assured of 
performing its allocatory functions. This policy is suitable for 
the conduct of "small wars" by a liberal democracy. In short 
••• a courageous ose of the tax Instrulent (Is) the lain desideratul of eeoDolie policy ••• land there 
151 no need to transforl the whole basis of production aId distribution in order to luster 
resources •••• 2 
The market and the price mechanism remain central to the 
economy. 
A defence contingency greater than this might create demands for 
personnel and finance, generate scarcities, and prompt a loss of 
business/investor confidence which would cause this policy to 
break down. Some of the symptoms of this policy disintegration 
might include the necessities of immediate supply, abnormal 
conditions of risk (affecting investment by business, which will 
not know the duration of the conflict, and the physical security 
of assets, where destruction by an enemy is a possibility), the 
unreliability of the market price as an allocative mechanism 
when government credit is unlimited and, as a consequence, the 
institution of a policy of price fixing. In short, the market 
and the price mechanism are suspended. 
The origins and definition of low level conflict lie between 
these two extremes of governmental economic and financial 
response, between peace and war (or more substantial conflict). 
Whether it is closer to peacetime experience, and hence a 
discrete, market oriented financial response can be conducted, 
or whether it is likely to develop the characteristics of a war, 
and hence the necessity for state control is paramount, only 
time, the circumstances of the contingency and the policies of 
the government, can determine. 
loble. in Peace and lar, London, !acllllaD and Co.Ltd., 1950, p.31. 
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Again, financial policy is not a constant variable and cannot be 
presumed. A national defence strategy is sought on the basis of 
the enduring fundamentals of the country's geographic 
environment; but the financial underpinnings of such a strategy 
continue to evolve at a dizzying pace (technologically, eg. the 
introduction of computers to transfer investment funds around 
the globe in near real time, or policy-wise, eg. the changed 
rules governing statutory Reserve Deposits in the context of the 
1988-89 Federal Budget). 
Financial policy is subject to several major influences and 
constraints, of which defence policy is but one. The principal 
influences on financial policy, even during significant military 
conflict, are likely to remain largely economic and political. 
Clausewitz is famous for his description of the "fog of war" in 
relation to military operations. This thesis argues that 
financial policy is equally subject to strains, to institutional 
pressures and to lack of reliable information for rational 
decision-making. It argues also that in most cases it is as 
important a component of the effective management of war or 
conflict as is defence policy. 
An understanding of the legal complexities of low level military 
threat has been recently pleaded for.) This paper argues that 
the economic complexities and financial implications should also 
be recognised . 
. _---_._-----
3. I.BeI9In, 'Legal COlplexltles In Lo, Level !breats', PacJfic Defence Reporter, Peter Isaacson 
Pablicatlons, Melboarne, Iprll 19", pp.16-17. 
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